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In the post-apartheid period, little research has focused on the economic welfare of South 
African mothers.  In particular there are few studies that compare the economic status of 
mothers by marital status. Many children in South Africa live in households without 
fathers (Posel and Devey 2006), which indicates that there is a high incidence of single 
motherhood in South Africa.  Previous research has shown that South African women are 
more likely to be poor than their male counterparts and female-headed households, on 
average, are poorer than male-headed households (Posel and Rogan 2009a; Armstrong et 
al. 2008; Hoogeveen and Özler 2006; Budlender 2005; Rose and Charlton 2002; Woolard 
and Leibbrandt 1999).  These results suggest that single mothers and their children would 
be more likely to be worse off than families that include men.   
 
 Historically, insufficient data on motherhood made it difficult to identify a national 
sample of mothers; however recent household surveys have made it easier to do so.  
Using the General Household Survey (GHS) 2006 I am able to identify all women aged 
from 19 to 65 who are co-resident with at least one of their children aged 18 or younger. 
A disadvantage of this sample is that it excludes not co-resident mothers who have left 
their household of origin – often in pursuit of better work opportunities.  Consequently 
the sample underestimates the extent of motherhood as well as the labour force 
participation rate of African single mothers in particular.   
 
Despite this limitation, I am able to gain useful insights into the economic welfare of 
South African mothers.  By undertaking a descriptive and poverty analysis I show that on 
average, African and White single co-resident mothers have an inferior economic status 
compared to African and White married co-resident mothers respectively.  I also show 
that disparities in income exist between the two races with White mothers, on average, 
having greater access to resources compared to African mothers.   
 
A benefit of the GHS 2006 is that it includes individual information on the receipt of 
social grant income. Thus I am able to quantify the impact of public transfers, as well as 
 vi
other categories of income, on poverty alleviation.  I show that African single co-resident 
mothers, in particular, are highly dependent on grants.  The study also explores the Child 
Support Grant (CSG) specifically and notes that the grant is limited in coverage and 
value.  Furthermore, I highlight that the only other formal method for single mothers to 
obtain financial assistance, is via the private maintenance system, which is fraught with 
inefficiencies and often the costs of engaging with the system far outweigh the benefits.  
This dissertation therefore highlights the plight of South African single co-resident 
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The primary objective of this dissertation is to compare the economic status of South 
African single mothers with that of their married counterparts.  Recent South African 
studies have shown that women are more likely to live in poverty than men and that 
female-headed households are more likely to be poor than male-headed households 
(Posel and Rogan 2009a; Armstrong et al. 2008; Hoogeveen and Özler 2006; Budlender 
2005; Rose and Charlton 2002; Woolard and Leibbrandt 1999).  South Africa also has a 
high proportion of children living in households without fathers.  Posel and Devey (2006) 
use household survey data to estimate that from 1993 to 2002, the proportion of South 
African children whose fathers were either absent from the household or dead increased 
from approximately 43 per cent to 57 per cent.  These results would suggest that there is a 
high incidence of single motherhood in South Africa, and that single-mother families 
would be more likely to be worse off than families that include men.   
 
Despite the apparent extent of single motherhood in South Africa, and despite the higher  
poverty rate among females, comparisons of the economic status of mothers by their 
marital status are notably absent from the literature.  Indeed, there are few studies in 
South Africa that have explored motherhood in general, possibly due to data limitations 
which in the past have made it difficult to match women with their children.  Due to 
South Africa’s history of apartheid, most studies on economic status and poverty have 
tended to focus on racial differences (see for example Van der Berg et al. 2009; Van der 
Berg et al. 2007; Hoogeveen and Özler 2006).  This may be another reason why few 
poverty studies have focused on gender differences, or on the economic well-being of 
mothers. 
 
Recent household surveys have made it possible to match women with their children thus 
facilitating research on motherhood.  This dissertation uses data from the 2006 General 
Household Survey (GHS) to identify a sample of mothers aged from 19 to 65 who are co-
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resident with at least one of their children aged 18 or younger.  The lack of a birth 
module within the GHS 2006 prevents all mothers from being identified and only those 
who are living with their children can be included in the sample via a maternal 
relationship question.  I analyse this group of mothers to ascertain whether single mothers 
who are co-resident with their children, on average, are economically disadvantaged 
compared to married mothers who are living with their children.1  This would be 
consistent with findings in many developed countries where single mothers and their 
families have been shown to be more vulnerable to poverty than other types of families 
(see for example Philo et al. 2009; Christopher et al. 2002; Wong et al. 1993).  A primary 
difference between these two family-types is that married mothers would be expected to 
benefit from the income earned by their male spouse whereas single mothers do not have 
a co-resident male partner who offers economic support.  Single mothers may receive 
financial support from other sources, for example, the income of other adults residing in 
their household, private maintenance paid by their former partner, or widows may receive 
benefits from a spousal life insurance policy.  However, international data show that 
notwithstanding the possibility of these alternate sources of income, single mothers, on 
average, continue to be economically disadvantaged compared to their married 
counterparts. 
 
An important consideration in South Africa is that mothers living with their children are 
less likely to be labour force participants compared to not co-resident mothers, which is 
likely to result in a sample of co-resident mothers underestimating the economic status of 
mothers in general (van der Stoep 2008).  This is particularly relevant for African single 
mothers, among whom labour migration rates are relatively high and who consequently 
are less likely to be co-resident with their children (Posel and van der Stoep 2008).  
Despite this data limitation, a study of co-resident mothers is significant as it provides an 
indication of the average economic status of single and married mothers and their 
children, which, in turn, would be expected to highlight the importance of developing and 
improving mechanisms to increase the welfare of South African single-mother families. 
                                                 
1 Throughout this study, married mothers denote mothers who indicated their marital status to be ‘married’ 
or ‘living together like husband and wife’ whilst single mothers denote mothers who are reported as being 
‘divorced or separated’, ‘widowed’ or ‘never married’. 
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I use two methods to compare the economic status of mothers by marital status.  First, I 
undertake a descriptive analysis of the data to compare differences in individual and 
household characteristics of mothers by marital status.  A descriptive analysis will not be 
able to ascertain whether single motherhood causes a woman to be relatively 
economically disadvantaged, but it can provide initial insights into this relationship.  
Second, I conduct a poverty analysis using the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty 
measures.  As part of the poverty analysis, I examine lifestyle indicators to gain insights 
into the standards of living of the two groups of mothers.  Furthermore, I use 
decomposition techniques to determine the contribution made by various categories of 
income towards poverty relief.   
 
Given South Africa’s political history, economic status and poverty levels have tended to 
vary along racial lines.  Apartheid-era political policies, of which Whites were the 
beneficiaries, have resulted in a skewed distribution of resources with highest poverty 
levels among Africans, and lowest levels among Whites.  To provide a comprehensive 
overview of the economic status of single mothers, I focus on Africans and Whites, with 
the latter group expected to be better off.  What is also of interest, however, is to examine 
the effect of marital status on mothers within each population group to see if single 
mothers are worse off than their married counterparts within each group.   
 
This dissertation is structured in the following way.  Chapter One provides an 
introduction to the study.  Chapter Two provides a review of theoretical literature on 
labour supply and income determination which explains why females are less likely to 
participate in the labour force and why they earn less than males.  Chapter Two also 
looks at gender differences in income poverty in South Africa, and provides reasons for 
why females are more likely to live in poor households than males.  I discuss the large 
number of children with absent fathers and how this would imply that there are many 
single-mother households in South Africa.  I also discuss the impact of gendered access 
to resources on single mothers and their households.  Lastly, Chapter Two discusses the 
efficacy of mechanisms in developed countries, and in South Africa, designed to increase 
single mothers’ access to resources.  
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In Chapter Three I outline the data used for the study, the sample of mothers identified 
and I compare the individual and household characteristics of co-resident single mothers 
with those of their married counterparts.  I include comparisons of education levels, 
living arrangements and various measures of income.  Chapter Four compares the socio-
economic status of mothers by marital status by conducting a poverty analysis and by 
comparing various lifestyle indicators.  The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty 
indices are calculated in order to quantify the poverty headcount rate, the poverty gap and 
the poverty gap squared.  I then decompose the FGT measures using the Shapley-value to 
compute the contribution made by various categories of income towards poverty 
alleviation.  An advantage of using data from the GHS 2006 is that it includes 
information on grant receipts, thus the impact of public transfers on economic welfare 
can be quantified.  Measuring poverty using income and expenditure data provides a 
useful indication of the extent of poverty; however, a more qualitative approach reveals 
useful insights into how poverty manifests itself and affects individuals’ quality of life 
(Woolard and Leibbrandt 1999).  Hence I identify various lifestyle indicators, such as 
access to medical aid, access to municipal services and ownership of assets, to compare 
the average standard of living of single mothers with that of married mothers.  Chapter 
Five concludes the study and suggests future work that can be undertaken to improve the 

















In this chapter I review the theoretical and empirical literature that describes the 
economic status of women and I discuss how that affects the welfare of single mothers. 
The primary objective of this chapter is to explore the reasons why single mothers are 
expected to be more likely to live in poverty than their married counterparts.      
 
Few studies have researched the prevalence or economic wellbeing of single mothers in 
South Africa.  There is evidence to suggest that many children live without fathers, and 
that a family headed by a woman is worse off than other types of households (Armstrong 
et al. 2008; Gustafsson and Worku 2006; Posel and Devey 2006; Rose and Charlton 
2002).  In this chapter I look at reasons why single-mother families living in South Africa 
would be expected to have less access to resources than other family types and I discuss 
certain steps that may be taken to improve their welfare. 
   
Section 2.2 discusses Gary Becker’s (1965) theory on household production and the 
allocation of time which explains why women have become specialised in performing 
household duties whilst men pursue careers in the job market.  In section 2.3 I discuss 
female poverty levels in South Africa and I explore the reasons why women, on average, 
have less access to resources than men.  The economic status of South African single 
mothers is also discussed.  Various mechanisms are available internationally and locally 
to provide assistance to single-mother families.  The effectiveness of these mechanisms is 
analysed in sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively.  Section 2.6 explores ways in which the 





2.2 Theory of labour supply and income determination 
 
In South Africa, the labour force participation rate of women has been lower than men 
(Hausmann et al. 2009; Casale and Posel 2002).  Moreover, women who have engaged in 
market work, on average, have earned less than their male counterparts (Posel and Rogan 
2009a; Ntuli 2007; Woolard and Woolard 2006; Budlender 2005). Becker’s (1965) 
theory of the allocation of time offers one possible explanation of why females, on 
average, have not attained the same wage and employment rates as males within the 
labour market.    
 
Becker (1965) explains the concept of “productive” consumption by households.  When 
household members are not engaged in market work, they are engaged in the production 
of commodities that maximise the household utility function.  Commodities may be in the 
form of pure leisure activities, for example, viewing a play or reading a book.    
Alternatively, the commodities produced may contribute towards household production, 
in the form of cleaning the house, cooking for the family or childcare.  The full cost of 
commodities includes the prices of capital goods and raw materials used in their 
production, as well as the indirect cost of an individual’s time as measured by foregone 
market earnings. 
 
Members of households engage in market work in order to earn income to afford to 
produce the various commodities.  The division of labour within households has 
traditionally resulted in females being more likely to assume responsibility for household 
production with males being primarily responsible for working in the labour market 
(Becker 1985).  This is largely due to men having developed a comparative advantage in 
market work and consequently being relatively more productive in the labour market than 
in household production in comparison to women.  
 
In contrast, women have developed a comparative advantage in household production.  
Whilst women have to assume responsibility for childbearing, women’s specialisation in 
household production is a product of several factors which include cultural norms about a 
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woman’s role in the family, as well as the preferences of some women to perform 
household duties. Consequently, female labour force participation rates have been lower 
than those of men which, in turn, has contributed towards women, on average, earning 
less than men (Mincer and Polachek 1974). 
 
Women may be less likely to invest in their human capital, with the family focusing more 
on the education and experience of the male whose career prospects traditionally have not 
been affected by childcare and housework commitments.  Similarly, employers 
anticipating job discontinuity may invest less in training and developing the skills of 
female employees.  With lower levels of formal and on-the-job training, women’s wages, 
on average, are likely to be much lower than men’s (Polachek and Mincer 1974).  The 
combined effects of women being primarily responsible for household production, and 
the lower investment in female human capital has led to women being less likely to be 
labour force participants and, on average, earning less than men.  Consequently, the 
gendered household division of labour is perpetuated given that the foregone earnings of 
a woman continue to be less than those of a man which promotes the specialisation of 
women in household production (Becker 1985). 
 
Becker (1985) notes that there has been a large increase in female labour force 
participation since the middle of the twentieth century and attributes this largely to the 
rise in female earning power which has effectively raised the opportunity cost of a 
woman’s time spent in household production.  A general rise in wages would also 
increase the male wage rate which would afford family members more time for non-
market activities via the income effect.  However, the rise in female labour force 
participation in many countries (Hausmann et al. 2009) would suggest that the positive 
female wage response has outweighed the negative income effect of higher earnings 
received by a family’s male market participant.  
 
Despite the increase in female labour force participation, Becker (1985) observes that the 
earnings of women, on average, remain inferior to those of men.  Indeed, recent evidence 
shows that average female wages continue to be less those of their male counterparts 
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(Hausmann et al. 2009).  Becker (1985) explains that this gender gap in earnings is 
largely due to the fact that despite being labour market participants, women tend to retain 
the primary responsibility for household production. Given that childcare and other 
housework are energy-intensive activities, women who do engage in market work whilst 
still being responsible for household chores are likely to be less productive than men and 
will seek out jobs that involve less energy and less time away from home (Becker 1985).  
This will also impact negatively on their wage rates, their choice of occupation and on the 
likelihood of their employers investing in their human capital (Polachek and Mincer 
1974).  The inferior economic status of women is therefore perpetuated.  As noted by 
Becker (1985: S41-S42):  
 
“a small initial difference can be transformed into large observed differences by the 
reinforcing effects of specialised investments”. 
 
A shortcoming of Becker’s (1965) theory of household production and utility 
maximisation is that it predicts that a family will maximise a household utility function 
subject to the family wealth constraint.  An underlying assumption is that where family 
members do not have identical preferences, household members are assumed to accept 
the preferences of the male head who as a benevolent decision-maker, is assumed to 
transfer resources to all members altruistically thereby ensuring all members act in the 
best interests of the household.  In many cases, however, income is unlikely to be shared 
equally by all household members and women are likely to be allocated fewer resources 
than men (Chant 2007; Budlender 2005).  Thus even when women live in a household 
that benefits from the income of an employed male, women may be significantly worse 
off. 
 
A further assumption of this model is that women who are engaged in household 
production will have the financial support of an income-earning male.  The increase in 
single motherhood worldwide, however, suggests that many women are not likely to have 
male partners to support them financially (Heuveline et al. 2003).  These women are 
potentially doubly disadvantaged by their inferior status within the labour market as well 
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as having no husband to support them.  Single-mother families would therefore be 
expected to be more likely to be poor than the traditional two-parent family depicted in 
Becker’s model.  
 
2.3 Gender differences in income poverty levels in South Africa 
 
Labour market research shows that although there has been a “feminisation of the labour 
force” in post-apartheid South Africa, women are still considerably less likely to 
participate in the labour force than men (Hausmann et al. 2009; Casale and Posel 2002).  
Moreover, unemployment rates among females are far greater than male unemployment 
rates (Posel and Rogan 2009a; Shepherd 2008; Banerjee et al. 2007).   
 
Women have made some advances within the labour market as they are being 
increasingly represented in higher-level, more lucrative occupations (Shepherd 2008).  
This may be attributed to the increase in female education levels, as well as to women 
benefiting from equal opportunity programmes (Casale and Posel 2005).2  Furthermore, 
more women appear to be operating their own businesses within the formal sector of the 
economy (Casale and Posel 2005).  
 
However, among individuals who are employed, a significant gender gap in earnings 
remains (Ntuli 2007; Woolard and Woolard 2006).  There is evidence that this has fallen 
over the past decade but the gender imbalances still exist (Muller 2009).  Part of the 
reason for the persistence of gender inequality is that much of the rise in female 
employment is associated with work in sectors that are characterised by lower earnings 
and job instability (Casale and Posel 2005).  For example, far more women are self-
employed within the informal sector or working as domestic workers, than men (Banerjee 
et al. 2007).  Furthermore, even where both genders find work in similar occupations, 
there is still a large difference in earnings with males, on average, earning more than 
females (Hausmann et al. 2009).   
                                                 
2 The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (Department of Labour 1998) defines women as one of the 
designated groups for whom employers must implement affirmative action measures. 
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Another reason for a persistent gender gap in income is that a bias within the household 
remains.  Women are still, whether by choice, norm or prejudice disproportionately 
responsible for household production, and in particular childcare (Goldblatt 2005).  This 
form of labour is unpaid and takes time away from income-earning employment 
(Woolard and Leibbrandt 1999).  As discussed in section 2.2, this division of labour 
within the household results in women earning lower wages than men on average.  
Accordingly, women are penalised when they choose, or are expected, to look after their 
children and as a result of them being expected to perform other household duties.   
 
A further reason why a woman’s income, on average, is lower than a man’s income is 
because females are more reliant on grant income (Posel and Rogan 2009a).  The value of 
social grants is generally lower than median earned income, and consequently, women 
are likely to have access to fewer resources than men (Posel and Rogan 2009a).  Table 
2.1 lists the values of grants as of 1 April 2009. 
 
Table 2. 1: The monthly values of social grants as of 1 April 2009 
Old Age grant R1,010 
Disability grant R1,010 
War veterans’ grant R1,030 
Grant-in-aid R240 
Child Support Grant R240 
Foster care grant R680 
Care-dependency grant R1,010 
Source: South African Social Security Agency (2009a) 
 
South Africa’s social security system has been described as relatively advanced for a 
middle-income developing country and comparable with programmes in many developed 
countries (Armstrong and Burger 2009; Booysen 2004).   Moreover there has been a 
considerable expansion of public transfers in recent years (Van der Berg et al. 2009).  
Whereas there were only 2.4 million grant recipients in total in April 1998 (Armstrong 
and Burger 2009), this number has increased to 13,401,138 as at 30 June 2009 (South 
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African Social Security Agency 2009b).  Table 2.2 presents the number of grants by grant 
type as at 30 June 2009. 
 
Table 2. 2: Number of grants by grant type at 30 June 2009 
Old Age grant 2,454,300 
Disability grant 1,282,702 
War veterans’ grant 1,453 
Grant-in-aid 47,947 
Child Support Grant 8,996,926 
Foster care grant 509,603 
Care-dependency grant 108,207 
Total 13,401,138 
Source: South African Social Security Agency (2009b) 
 
The category that has experienced considerable growth, and that is largely responsible for 
the expansion of the system, is the Child Support Grant (CSG) (Armstrong and Burger 
2009). Makiwane and Udjo (2006) show that in March 1999, 0.27 per cent of eligible 
children were obtaining the CSG and this figure had grown to 44.86 per cent by March 
2005.  Part of the reason for the increased coverage is that the age limit has been 
increased.  When the CSG was initially introduced in 1998 only children under the age of 
seven qualified (Triegaardt 2005).  Currently it covers children under the age of 16; 
however it is intended to cover children between the ages of 15 and 18 in a phased 
manner over the next three years (Department of Social Development 2009; ANC 2009).   
A detailed discussion of the CSG follows in section 2.5. 
 
Of particular interest when studying the welfare of mothers is the role played by grant 
income in improving the economic status of these women and their children.  As 
highlighted by Posel and Rogan (2009a), women, on average, are more dependent on 
grant income than men.  Moreover, Goldblatt (2005) notes that females are the primary 
recipients of the CSG.  Thus, grant income would be expected to contribute towards 
improving the welfare of mothers, and in particular single mothers who do not have a co-
resident male partner to support their families.  Despite the fact that grants are relatively 
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low compared to median earnings, previous studies have shown that they have played a 
major role in poverty alleviation and that they are well targeted as they have been 
successful in reaching the poor individuals they are intended to assist (Armstrong and 
Burger 2009; Armstrong et al. 2008; Samson et al. 2004).  Thus grants would be 
expected to assist in raising the welfare of single mothers, in particular, but they would be 
unlikely to elevate them to the economic status of married mothers who would be 
expected to have the earnings of a male spouse to support them   
 
As a consequence of the factors described above, women are more likely to live in 
poverty than men.  Posel and Rogan (2009a), working with a poverty line of 322 Rands 
per capita per month (measured in 2000 prices) show that females are significantly more 
likely than males to live in poor households.  Furthermore, poverty rates among males 
have fallen faster than poverty rates among females.  Using data from the 1997 and 1999 
October Household Surveys and from the 2004 and 2006 General Household Surveys, 
Posel and Rogan (2009a) show that from 1997 to 2006, the rate fell by 4.8 percentage 
points among men, and only by 2.2 percentage points among women.   
 
Over time, an increasing number of women have been living in households without an 
income-earning male (Posel and Rogan 2009a).  One possible explanation for this may be 
the falling marriage rates among African women (Posel and Rogan 2009a; Gustafsson 
and Worku 2006; Casale and Posel 2002).  This has lead to an increase in the number of 
households that rely primarily on the income earned by a woman, or on social grant 
income.  Due to the gender inequalities that exist, when households are highly dependent 
on the income received by women, they are more vulnerable to poverty.   
 
Possibly also as a consequence of low marital rates, there has been a significant increase 
in the number of households headed by females (Posel and Rogan 2009a).  Individuals 
named as the household head tend to be the primary income providers (Posel and Rogan 
2009a) so it is not surprising that female-headed households are more likely to be poor 
than male-headed households (Posel and Rogan 2009a; Armstrong et al. 2008; 
Hoogeveen and Özler 2006; Rose and Charlton 2002; Woolard and Leibbrandt 1999).  
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Budlender (2005) shows that in 1995 and 2002, income and expenditure in male-headed 
households was more than double that of female-headed households.  Furthermore, Posel 
and Rogan (2009a) calculate that in 2006, 32.5 per cent of male-headed households were 
poor, compared to 62 per cent of female-headed households.  
 
Measuring female poverty levels using household and income data may fail to capture 
women’s true experience of poverty, however.  In particular this type of study would fail 
to capture the many benefits to women when they live in a female-headed household.  
When living with males, women may be victims of domestic violence, they may suffer 
from an uneven distribution of household resources and from a lack of autonomy (Chant 
2007; Budlender 2005).  It is therefore important to consider that under some 
circumstances living without men may afford women a better quality of life that is not 
captured by income and expenditure data.3   
 
2.3.1 Poverty levels of single mothers in South Africa 
 
There is little work on the incidence of single motherhood in South Africa but work on 
fatherhood suggests that there are a large number of children in South African who are 
growing up without co-resident fathers.  Posel and Devey (2006) show that from 1993 to 
2002, some 43 to 57 per cent of South African children had absent or deceased fathers.  
Furthermore, Gustafsson and Worku (2006) use Census 2001 data to show that 48.4 per 
cent of African mothers between the ages of 20 and 40 had never been married.  These 
findings, together with the increase in female household-headship, would suggest that 
there are many households in South Africa headed by single mothers.  For reasons 
discussed in the previous section, these households would be expected to have less access 
to resources and to be more at risk of being poor.  
 
If non-resident fathers are alive, they may be capable of contributing financially towards 
the wellbeing of the single mother’s household.  Posel and Devey (2006) estimate that 
                                                 
3 Similarly, living with men may afford women a better quality of life in a way not captured by income and 
expenditure data. 
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between 1993 and 2002 the percentage of children with absent (living) fathers ranged 
from 36 to 45.8 per cent.  South Africa, like many other countries, has a private 
maintenance system designed to ensure that non-resident parents take financial 
responsibility for their children.  However, the inefficiencies of this system have made it 
easy for non-resident fathers to evade the financial duty they owe towards their children 
(Bonthuys 2008a; Bonthuys 2008b).  The failings of the South African private 
maintenance system will be explored further in section 2.5 and the effect of the 
malfunctioning maintenance system as well as the effect of a gendered access to 
resources on the socio-economic status of single mothers will be examined in Chapters 
Three and Four. 
 
2.4 Mechanisms in developed countries to increase single mothers’ access to 
resources 
 
Several international studies have shown that single-mother families, on average, tend to 
be worse off than traditional two-parent families (Philo et al. 2009; Christopher et al. 
2002; Wong et al. 1993).  The economic status of single mothers varies between nations 
with some countries providing greater financial assistance than others.  Much attention 
has therefore been focused on investigating the types of mechanisms that are most 
successful in improving the standards of living of single mothers and their children. 
 
Wong et al. (1993) investigate the economic status of single-mother families in eight 
countries, namely Australia, Canada, France, Germany (the Federal Republic), Norway, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the USA.  Data are obtained from the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) which sources information from, for example, population surveys, 
household income and expenditure surveys and tax files in the various nations.  Single-
mother families are defined as households headed by mothers younger than 65 who are 
divorced, separated, widowed or never-married and who live with one or more child 
under the age of 18.  There are no other adults living with the family.  In each country, 
the economic status of single mothers can be measured as the ratio of their net disposable 
income relative to the average net disposable income of two-parent families.  
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Analysing statistics collected between 1979 and 1984, Wong et al. (1993: 177) find that:  
 
“cross-country differences in demographic characteristics, labour force 
participation rates, levels of public and private transfers, and the degree of income 
testing account for much of the difference in the relative economic status of single-
mother families in different countries”. 
 
They show that increases in private and public transfer income raise the welfare of single 
mothers but that the income-testing of benefits reduces economic wellbeing.  The adverse 
effects of means-testing are largely due to the negative effects on labour force 
participation.  Women with inferior job opportunities who are not likely to earn much in 
paid employment would have a greater incentive to rely on social welfare instead of 
earnings.  In contrast to this, universal benefits would not be taken away from low-
income women should they enter paid employment.  Thus, poorer single mothers would 
be more likely to work if benefits were not income-tested.  Labour force participation, in 
turn, considerably improves the well-being of single mothers (Wong et al. 1993). 
 
A more recent study by Christopher et al. (2002) investigates the gender gap in 
poverty in eight developed countries: Australia, Canada, France, (the former) West 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the USA.  Using 1994 
and 1995 data from the Luxembourg Income Study they examine the effects of single 
parenthood, gendered differences in earnings and state transfer programmes on gender 
gaps in poverty.  In this study, single-mother families are defined as households 
headed by single females aged from 25 to 54 who live with children under 18.  There 
may be additional adults, for example, a grandparent in the household and any income 
provided by these individuals is incorporated in the calculation of household income. 
Christopher et al. (2002) note that while the size of the gap varies from country to 
country, women’s poverty is higher than men’s poverty in all nations except for 
Sweden.  Moreover, after controlling for the effects of differences in age and 
education, Christopher et al. (2002) find that for all states except Sweden, single-
mother families have a greater likelihood of being poor than any other type of family.  
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Swedish single mothers are less likely to be poor compared to single fathers, single 
female non-parents and single male non-parents.  However, they are still more likely 
to be in poverty compared to married parents, and married non-parents (Christopher et 
al. 2002). 
 
Christopher et al. (2002) investigate the extent to which welfare systems and labour 
markets in the various countries contribute towards closing the gender gap in poverty 
and by implication assisting single-mother families.  The existence of state taxation 
and transfer systems reduces the gap in all countries, a finding which indicates that the 
implementation of a public welfare programme pulls more women out of poverty than 
it does men.  The study shows that welfare systems in Sweden and the Netherlands are 
most effective in reducing the gender poverty gap – by 51 and 21 per cent 
respectively. In all other countries, the reduction in the gap is substantially lower at 
figures of eight per cent or less.  These results suggest that the tax and transfer systems 
in Sweden and the Netherlands are more woman-friendly than those in the other 
nations.  The fact that differences in male and female poverty rates still remain in most 
countries however, shows that public benefits alone, even when they are targeted 
towards women, do not eliminate these differences. 
 
The gender inequalities that exist in labour markets around the world also contribute 
towards the higher poverty rates among women compared to men.  Christopher et al. 
(2002) focus on single workers as it is single individuals that drive the gender gaps in 
poverty.  Given that household data are used to quantify the poor, a male and female 
living in the same household will have the same poverty measure.  Measured 
differences between the sexes are therefore highlighted when using data on single 
persons.  In all countries except Sweden, when personal market earnings are isolated 
as the only source of income, women’s poverty rates are higher than men’s.  They 
conclude that lower rates of female labour force participation, lower female wage 
rates, the greater number of women in part-time employment and their greater 
tendency to reside with children all result in women, on average, being poorer than 
men. 
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To eliminate the effects of part-time employment, Christopher et al. (2002) restrict the 
sample to full-time workers.  Results show that the gender poverty gap in most 
countries tends to fall but still exists.  This suggests that differences in wage rates and 
in job opportunities are still factors causing the different poverty rates for males and 
females.  An implication of this is that increasing female employment rates per se will 
not eradicate gender poverty gaps and countries that attempt to improve the economic 
status of single mothers purely by increasing their employment will not achieve their 
objective unless other inequalities within the labour market are simultaneously 
addressed.   
 
France is an example of a country that has generous employment supports for 
mothers– for example subsidized child care.  Therefore, the labour force participation 
of women is less likely to be constrained by childcare commitments.  However, France 
still experiences moderately high gender poverty gaps, which would suggest that the 
solution is not just to get women into the labour force (Christopher et al. 2002).  
General job market characteristics, such as the types of jobs women have access to and 
their rates of remuneration, need to be improved so that female labour force 
participants have the same status as their male counterparts.  
 
Sweden exists as a notable exception when analysing the economic status of single-
mother families.  Swedish mothers benefit from employment supports, (such as 
subsidized child care, job protection and paid parental leave), they receive state 
transfers and allowances (such as child benefits and housing benefits) (Ryrstedt 2006), 
and they benefit from a labour market characterised by fewer gender inequalities than 
elsewhere in the world.  Given that they are able to combine income from the labour 
market with the substantial assistance they receive in the form of state transfers, 
Swedish women are in a fortunate position where “almost all women are able to form 
households without male partners and escape poverty” (Christopher et al. 2002: 235). 
 
Although many Swedish single mothers work part-time, this does not appear to 
increase their poverty levels compared to men. Indeed, when female and male full-
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time workers are compared, the gender poverty gap actually increases compared to 
when all workers – full-time and part-time – are compared.  It would appear, therefore, 
that women are not heavily penalised if they choose to be the primary caregiver of 
their child.   
 
Christopher et al. (2002) caution that increased labour force participation may lead to 
women exchanging dependency on a male spouse for dependency on employers.  
Gender discrimination in the form of inferior job opportunities and lower wages for 
women is encountered in labour markets around the world (Fortin 2005; Blau and 
Kahn 2000). Whilst Sweden’s labour market is less discriminatory than those in many 
other nations, it is still characterised by sex segregation.  A major advantage in 
Sweden, therefore, is that women, including single mothers, are not dependent on one 
institution.  They are able to improve their economic status by increased labour force 
participation as well as via generous social welfare programmes.  By implication, 
improving the status of single mothers requires a multi-faceted approach which 
includes social benefits targeted to assist single mothers, and women in general, as 
well as taking all the steps necessary to ensure a non-discriminatory labour market. 
 
Norway is another country that appears to have been successful in reducing the 
poverty rates among single mothers.  Bratberg and Tjøtta (2008) investigate the 
income effects of divorce in families with dependent children in Norway and assess 
the effectiveness of the various state programmes and interventions designed to assist 
children in divorced families.  They use a random sample of the population drawn 
from a longitudinal database containing individual level information for the years 
1989 to 1996.  
 
Norway has a low level of income inequality, a high rate of female labour force 
participation and a fairly generous post-divorce income programme for divorcees who 
have custody of children.  The support given to custodians includes child benefits for 
each child plus one additional child.  Thus a custodial parent with two children will 
actually receive the benefit for three.  Support is also given in the form of extra tax 
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deductions as well as benefits to assist with childcare.  Furthermore, a custodian not 
earning any market income will receive extra benefits.  A major advantage of the 
Norwegian system is that maintenance payments from the non-resident parent are 
enforced by the government.  The state prescribes the minimum level of child support4 
and if the non-resident parent defaults, the government pays the custodial parent and 
the authorities then assume responsibility for recovering the amount from the 
defaulting parent. 
 
Bratberg and Tjøtta (2008) compare the average economic status of divorced 
individuals with that of married individuals.  A lack of data on cohabitation prevents 
them from identifying divorcees who are cohabiting with other adults.  They identify 
this as a limitation of their study as they are unable to identify divorcees who have 
been able to improve their economic status as a result of pooling resources with 
household co-habitants.  However, they maintain that the primary findings of their 
study are unlikely to be affected by this omission.  The household earnings for single-
mother families are therefore based solely on the gross taxable own earnings of the 
mother as reflected in the tax register. 
 
Bratberg and Tjøtta (2008) compare the following income measures: 
 
A = Post-tax earnings before any child-related transfers; 
B = A + ordinary child allowances; 
C = B + extra advantages for custodial parents; 
D = C + child support from the non-custodial to the custodial parent. 
 
They factor in equivalence scales to incorporate economies of scale in household 
expenditure as well as the average time children spend with non-custodial parents and 
they then compare income by gender, marital and custody status.  Comparing income 
                                                 
4 Bratberg and Tjøtta (2008) note that traditionally the minimum rate was 11 per cent of gross income for 
one child, 18 per cent for two, 24 percent for three and a minimum of 28 percent for four.  Reforms in 2002 
resulted in future calculations factoring in the earnings of both parents together with the actual child-related 
costs. 
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measure D, divorced men with custody, on average, have the highest income levels.  
Their income levels, on average, are greater than those of married individuals, as well 
as divorced women with or without custody.  Divorced men with custody and married 
persons earn, on average, approximately 37 per cent and 31 per cent more than 
divorced women with custody respectively, so single mothers are still relatively 
disadvantaged.  However the mean income measure D for divorced women with 
custody is substantially higher than their measure A.  Their income measure A is about 
57 per cent and 44 per cent less than measure A for married individuals and divorced, 
custodial males respectively.  These figures illustrate that correctly targeted state 
programmes can significantly improve the economic status of single mothers. These 
programmes, however, do not appear to have been successful in completely 
eliminating inequalities. 
 
Divorced women without custody, on average, are worst off economically.  As 
Bratberg and Tjøtta (2008) note, this is probably due to the loss of financial support 
from an income-earning male as well as the fact that they do not receive any of the 
child supports described above.  A major gap in the Norwegian system would appear 
to be that divorced women without custody of their children suffer the most from the 
effects of gender discrimination.  This is highlighted by the fact that divorced men 
without custody, on average, receive about 58 per cent more income than divorced 
women without custody when comparing income measure D.  Bratberg and Tjøtta 
(2008) point out that the focus of their study is on child benefits and consequently 
social welfare payments are excluded from the analysis.  These payments may serve to 
alleviate the situations of divorced, non-custodial mothers. 
  
Bratberg and Tjøtta (2008) observe that a vital feature of the system is the state 
enforcement of maintenance payments within divorced families.  They calculate that, 
on average, child support from a non-resident parent serves to almost equalize the 
income of a custodial mother with that of a non-custodial father (going from income 
measure C to D).   Prior to accounting for private maintenance transfers a non-
custodial father, on average, receives approximately 24 per cent more income than a 
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custodial mother (comparing income measure C).  Given this finding, it is important to 
explore the private maintenance systems in other countries to assess whether all are as 
effective as the Norwegian system. 
 
Skinner and Davidson (2009) compare child maintenance schemes in 14 countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway; Sweden, the United Kingdom and the USA.  
Their study relies mainly on data supplied by national informants, predominantly 
academics, in response to a questionnaire.  Child maintenance policy varies from 
country to country.  Differences include whether the court or an agency is responsible 
for concluding agreements between parents; the flexibility of parents to arrange their 
own agreements; the size of maintenance payments and whether there is an advanced 
maintenance scheme in place.  
 
The advantage of court determination of maintenance amounts is that as legal 
judgments they are enforceable.  Disadvantages are that they are subject to the 
discretion of judges which can be inconsistent from case to case.  Legal costs, 
adversarial settings and delays are major drawbacks of a court system.  The role of an 
administrative agency varies from nation to nation.  For those countries that have an 
agency, their functions can include the assessment, receipt, transference and 
enforcement of maintenance payments. Skinner and Davidson (2009) note that when 
agencies are responsible for determining amounts, they are often calculated using set 
guidelines and formulae.  This can serve as an advantage as a predictable outcome 
may reduce parental conflict.  Disadvantages of agency arrangements are that their 
bureaucratic structures may undermine efficiency, and that formulae can be inflexible 
and confusing.   
 
The freedom of parents to reach their own agreements also varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  Advantages of parental decision-making are that it may facilitate cordial 
relations between separated parents, and it is potentially a quicker and less costly 
method. A disadvantage of this method, however, is that, if not ratified by a court, the 
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agreements may not have legal standing and may run into enforcement problems.  
Skinner and Davidson (2009: 37) note that further problems with private agreements 
as indicated by the respondents from the various countries are that: 
 
“(t)hey could also lead to different maintenance outcomes for children in similar 
situations and the potential for one parent to manipulate or coerce the other into an 
unsatisfactory arrangement was also highlighted”. 
 
An issue that needs to be addressed in all countries is the size of maintenance 
payments.  Skinner and Davidson (2009) find that the income and expenses of the 
non-resident parent, normally the father, are important components of a maintenance 
calculation in all countries and that generally the ‘needs’ of a child could be 
considered when determining amounts.  Trends in determining maintenance amounts 
show that the contact time a non-resident parent spends with a child is factored into 
the maintenance calculation.  Skinner and Davidson (2009) find that when a child 
spends the same amount of time with both parents, then child maintenance transfers 
could in principle be eliminated in many of the countries studied.  Presumably this 
would be to allow for costs incurred by the non-resident parent when the child is 
visiting with them.  The danger of this is that a non-resident parent may be motivated 
to seek greater contact with the child purely to reduce the amount of maintenance they 
are required to pay, and in certain countries, to increase the state benefits they receive.  
In some countries, the awarding of various public benefits is based on a child’s living 
arrangements.  For example, in Sweden and Norway, the child benefit is paid to the 
parent with whom the child mainly lives (Ryrstedt 2006)5.  It is debatable whether a 
financial motive for seeking contact with a child would result in the contact being in 
the child’s best interests (Ryrstedt 2006).  Moreover, given that in many countries 
women, on average, earn less than men (Hausmann et al. 2009), reduced financial 
support for the mother as a result of increased contact time with the father is likely to 
render the mother’s household economically disadvantaged compared to the father’s.   
                                                 
5 In Norway, the allowance can be divided between parents if the child lives with both of them alternately.  
This may also be the case in some circumstances in Sweden (Ryrstedt 2006). 
 23
Defaulting on maintenance payments is a problem encountered in many countries 
around the world.  This has resulted in authorities coming up with innovative 
enforcement mechanisms.  These range from attaching earnings, charging interest on 
debt, deducting from bank accounts, attaching and selling assets, revoking drivers 
licenses, confiscating passports, criminal prosecution and imprisonment, although the 
latter two appear to be seldom used in practice.   
 
Australia is an example of a country where the Child Support Agency (CSA) 
collaborates with the Taxation Office in order to assess the liability of a non-resident 
parent.  The effects of the Australian CSA maintaining strong links with the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) are that they “enhance the effectiveness of the assessment, 
compliance and enforcement processes” (Fehlberg and Maclean 2009: 8).  Some 
maintenance defaulters will continue to avoid their responsibilities by lying about their 
taxable income.  However, individuals may be less inclined to lie if the threat of 
prosecution has the weight of a taxation office behind it. 
 
An effective way of ensuring an uninterrupted flow of child maintenance payments to 
the co-resident parent is via a guaranteed maintenance scheme (Skinner and Davidson 
2009).  The advantage of these schemes is that they guarantee children a minimum 
level of economic support irrespective of the conduct of the non-resident parent.  
Some disadvantages of these schemes are that, if means tested they can negatively 
affect work incentives, they may provide incentives for non-resident parents not to 
pay, and where a flat rate exists, children may be receiving much less maintenance 
than what was actually awarded by a court.  Furthermore, there may be delays in 
receiving the funds.   
 
Countries with guaranteed maintenance systems appear to be far more successful in 
ensuring that co-resident parents receive maintenance payments. Skinner and 
Davidson (2009) show that the countries with the highest proportion of non-widowed 
single parents receiving child maintenance payments are Sweden and Norway – 94.8 
and 77.7 per cent respectively.  By comparison, the percentages in Australia, the 
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United Kingdom and the USA are 33.2, 21.5 and 31.7 per cent respectively, which are 
among the lowest.  Sweden and Norway have guaranteed payment schemes whereas 
the other nations do not.  Although the average maintenance amounts in Sweden and 
Norway tend to be relatively low, the co-resident parent is spared the uncertainty of 
not knowing whether monies will be paid or not.  Furthermore, maintenance amounts 
in these countries are supplemented by relatively generous public benefits (Bratberg 
and Tjøtta 2008; Ryrstedt 2006; Christopher et al. 2002). 
 
Skinner and Davidson (2009) cite the research of Skinner et al. (2007) which 
evaluates the potential of child maintenance to reduce poverty (regardless of whether 
payments are actually received or not).  Their results show that child maintenance 
payments have the potential to make a contribution towards poverty reduction.  
Decreasing maintenance default rates may therefore make a considerable contribution 
towards poverty alleviation. 
 
Given that single mothers, on average, are worse off than their married counterparts, 
some researchers have asked whether marriage can be viewed as an effective anti-
poverty strategy (Pandey and Kim 2008; Mauldin and Mimura 2007).  This is 
particularly relevant in the USA where the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) has sought to alleviate poverty by, among 
other things, promoting and maintaining marriage.  Mauldin and Mimura (2007) 
emphasize that whilst marriage can be helpful in improving the circumstances of 
single mothers, the quality of the marriage is of considerable importance.  They 
suggest that interventions prior to marriage that help women to understand the 
potential consequences of poor marital choices, may be more effective than assistance 
programmes that attempt to mediate after a marriage has taken place.  Pandey and Kim 
(2008) stress that in promoting marriage, the authorities must not overlook the role of 
education in improving the welfare of single mothers by increasing their earnings 
capabilities.  Moreover, they argue that more educated women are likely to have better 
marriage prospects and enjoy more stable unions.  They therefore advocate using 
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funds to support the higher education of single mothers rather than just implementing 
programmes that promote marriage. 
 
2.5 Mechanisms in South Africa to increase single mothers’ access to resources 
 
In South Africa, there are two formal mechanisms whereby single mothers can obtain 
financial assistance.  They can claim maintenance from their former partner and/or they 
can obtain financial support from the government through social welfare grants. 
Maintenance is either in the form of child or spousal support.  Bonthuys (2008b: 334) 
notes that following Constitutional Court judgments: 
 
 “the duty to maintain children rests firstly on their parents.  The State must 
 provide mechanisms to facilitate enforcement of children’s rights against their 
 parents and, where there are no parents, or where parents cannot maintain 
 children, the State must maintain them”.  
 
Child maintenance payments are obtained via the private maintenance system.  One of 
the mandates of the Lund Committee for Child and Family Support (hereafter referred 
to as the Lund Committee), which was established by the Welfare Ministry in 1995, 
was to explore ways in which parental financial support could be increased (Lund 
2008).  The committee reached the conclusion that reform of the deeply faulty private 
maintenance system was a necessity and several of its recommendations were 
incorporated into the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 (Lund 2008).  However, numerous 
inefficiencies persist and in many cases the costs of engaging with the system continue 
to outweigh the benefits.   
 
Problems first arise during the pre-court process (Bonthuys 2008b).  The burden of 
obtaining, or increasing, maintenance for a child from a non-resident parent (usually the 
father) is borne by the residential parent (usually the mother) who has to initiate 
proceedings.  Maintenance officers, in many instances, have been unable to obtain the 
necessary financial and employment details from fathers who have been able drag out the 
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pre-court process by failing to appear at court, or by bringing incomplete documentation 
(Bonthuys 2008b).  Mothers have been faced with the transport, emotional, time, 
childcare and other costs associated with having to appear repeatedly at court, prepare the 
necessary documentation and engage with uncooperative fathers and ill-equipped 
maintenance officers (Bonthuys 2008b).  A single mother who has entered the 
maintenance system is clearly in need of financial support so can ill-afford days off from 
work or the costs of childcare. 
 
These difficulties are more acute for poor and rural women who have little hope of 
covering any of the above-mentioned costs, and hence of accessing the system (Bonthuys 
2008b; Goldblatt 2005).  Moreover, poorer and illiterate women are more dependent on 
maintenance officers to explain the process to them, to help them fill in the necessary 
forms and to manage all correspondence relevant to their cases.  Given the shortage of 
adequately trained maintenance staff, these women are likely to be disadvantaged when 
trying to secure a reasonable amount of maintenance (Goldblatt 2005).   
 
A mother has the option of employing a lawyer but for many single mothers, in particular 
poorer mothers, this service is likely to be well beyond their means.  Given that men, on 
average, continue to earn more than women, fathers are more likely to have the funds to 
pay for legal representation than mothers (Bonthuys 2008b).  Fathers are therefore more 
likely to navigate the system successfully and ensure an outcome in their favour.  
 
If a mother has been successful in obtaining an order directing the father to pay 
maintenance, the mother faces the next uphill battle of enforcing the order.  A father may 
just stop paying, in which case it is the mother who again incurs the above-mentioned 
costs in dealing with the courts.  Fathers can take advantage of the protracted legal 
processes as in many cases fathers are not ordered to pay arrears maintenance, which 
effectively forces a mother to pay for the amounts that were defaulted on, prior to and 
during legal proceedings (Bonthuys 2008a; Smythe and Artz 2005).  Moreover, 
defaulters are seldom suitably punished.  In a small number of cases, they have received 
suspended or ordinary jail sentences, but in many cases they escape punishment which 
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reinforces the incentive to default on payments (Bonthuys 2008a).  Fathers may furnish 
highly technical reasons for not paying, and the burden of refuting these arguments falls 
on the mother.  With fathers, on average, being more likely to afford legal representation, 
they are more likely to prevail in litigation (Bonthuys 2008b).     
 
Maintenance awards have been notoriously low and have often been determined simply 
by asking the father how much he can afford to pay.  In many instances, the cost of the 
child, or the income of parents, do not appear to have even been factored into the 
maintenance calculation, despite this being required by the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
(see Appendix 2A) (Budlender 2005; Department of Justice 1998b).  Bonthuys (2008a: 
198) cites a 2004 study conducted for the Commission of Gender Equality that found that 
in the sample of maintenance files examined: 
 
“the median monthly income of women claiming maintenance was R800.  Eighty 
one per cent of the men from whom maintenance was claimed were employed in 
the formal sector and 9 per cent in the informal sector, with a median income of  
R2 845.  The median expenditure on children as reported by claimants was R980 
per month.  The average amount of maintenance ordered was R272 per child”. 
 
Thus, on average, the fathers in this study earned over three times more than the mothers 
yet the mothers were required to cover over two thirds of the children’s expenses.  When 
income levels are considered, some fathers have employed devious methods to understate 
their resources in order to reduce their maintenance obligation, for example, ‘selling’ 
their assets to girlfriends, family trusts or other family members (Bonthuys 2008b). 
 
Another factor undermining the efficacy of the maintenance system is that fathers may 
use custody blackmail to stop mothers from making financial claims against them 
(Varcoe and Irwin 2004).  Losing custody of their children is a reason why many women 
remain in abusive relationships (CSVR 2008).  It is plausible that many mothers would 
drop maintenance complaints if threatened with a custody battle which would be both 
emotionally and financially draining.  The tendency of the South African legal system to 
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separate maintenance enquiries from custody hearings facilitates this type of threatening 
conduct.  
 
The courts have come up with some innovative solutions in dealing with maintenance 
defaulters which include ordering control over a father’s pension fund and annuities out 
of which maintenance payments will be made, as well as periodical imprisonment over 
weekends (Bonthuys 2009b).  The courts are also empowered to issue emolument 
attachment orders which effectively subtract payments directly from a father’s salary 
(Lund 2008).  Courts may also attach assets owned by the father and use the proceeds of 
sales to pay maintenance, although this remedy is frustrated by fathers who ‘sell’ their 
assets to third parties.  Many cases of maintenance default, however, do not make it to the 
stage of adjudication as a result of the numerous costs described above.  Consequently, 
only a few mothers benefit from these innovative solutions whilst many maintenance 
defaulters get away with not paying for their children.   
 
There have been some improvements to the system in that maintenance investigators are 
starting to be appointed in courts (Bonthuys 2008b).  Many courts still lack investigators 
hence the task of tracking a former partner and researching their economic status still 
falls on the mother who will often lack the resources to conduct this type of search.  
Moreover, in many cases, women have left a relationship as they have been victims of 
domestic violence and are afraid of claiming maintenance from their former partner as 
this may place them in harms way (Goldblatt 2005).6  Maintenance investigators may 
partially solve this problem by serving as an interface between a mother and her former 
partner during the information-gathering phase, but they are unlikely to be able to prevent 
all acts of violence.  Moreover, the incompetence of maintenance staff may undermine 
any potential gains from the appointment of investigators. 
 
                                                 
6 Lund (2008) notes that whilst the Lund Committee was sitting, it was advised of an incident where a 
mother had been shot dead in a court room by the father against whom she was claiming maintenance.   
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Spousal maintenance is awarded to a person upon the dissolution of a marriage, and is not 
obtained via the private maintenance system.  In many instances, it only lasts for a 
limited period of time and is seen as ‘rehabilitative’ in order to give the spouse receiving 
maintenance the opportunity to find employment and become self-supporting.  Courts 
seem to favour the ‘clean-break’ principle that promotes financial independence of 
individuals following divorce (Bonthuys 2008a).  Moreover, spousal maintenance often 
does not include a specific portion to cover ongoing childcare costs. 
 
In determining spousal maintenance, courts appear to fail to account for the negative 
effect childrearing would have had on a mother’s career prospects, and how the mother’s 
childcare and homemaking would have positively impacted on her spouse’s career.  As 
Bonthuys (2008a) notes, even if a mother finds employment after divorce, her earnings 
capacity is always likely to be behind that of her former partner’s.  As an attempt to 
overcome these inequalities, in principle, the parent who has been primarily responsible 
for childrearing is awarded a greater share of the marital assets but, as Bonthuys (2008a) 
observes, this seldom happens in practice.  Mothers are therefore seldom fully 
compensated for their role in household production. 
 
Smythe and Artz (2005) point out that defaulting on maintenance is an act of domestic 
violence as defined by the South African Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 
(Department of Justice 1998a).7  Moreover, economic abuse is a form of violence 
which the United Nations (2006) identifies as having been neglected and in need of 
more attention.  Economic abuse appears to have been largely overlooked in South 
Africa where the maintenance system in its current form serves to facilitate this type 
of abuse.  It is widely acknowledged that South Africa has a very high level of 
domestic violence (SAPS 2009; Seedat et al. 2009; United Nations Development Fund 
for Women 2009) and in response to this, in the State of the Nation address (Zuma 
2009), the President re-affirmed the government’s commitment to combating crimes 
                                                 
7 Included within the definition of economic abuse in section 1(ix)(a) of the South African Domestic 
Violence Act is “the unreasonable deprivation of economic or financial resources to which a complainant is 
entitled under law or which the complainant requires out of necessity, including household necessities for 
the complainant, and mortgage bond repayments or payment of rent in respect of the shared residence”. 
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against women and children.  Demonstrating this commitment would require reform 
of the private maintenance system. 
 
In many instances, fathers are too poor to pay anything and under these circumstances, 
the financial assistance available to mothers is in the form of the Child Support Grant 
(CSG) from the state.  The introduction of the CSG was a recommendation of the Lund 
Committee as a method of transferring cash to poor children.  The implementation of the 
CSG in 1998 coincided with the phasing out of the State Maintenance Grant (SMG) 
which had been in place since 1947 (Triegaardt 2005).  Just before its phasing out, the 
SMG reached approximately 400,000 poor women and children and was valued at R410 
for parents and R135 per child under the age of 21, with an upper limit of R700 per 
month (Lund 2008; Goldblatt 2005).  The amount paid to a child’s parent recognized the 
caregiver’s role in raising a child. 
 
Budget constraints prevented the extension of the SMG to all needy South African 
families; hence the Lund Committee was tasked with developing an affordable 
alternative.  Moreover, the SMG was conceived using the traditional two-parent family as 
a model which was inappropriate in the South African context which was characterised 
by different family forms largely as a consequence of apartheid policies (Lund 2008).  
For example, many children did not have a parent as their primary caregiver but were 
cared for by their grandparents and other family members.  The termination of the SMG 
was met with much resistance but as noted by Lund (2008: 30):  
 
“It seemed clear that the amount of R1.2 billion then being spent annually on SMGs 
could be easily lost, without being replaced by anything else”.  
 
A primary focus of the Lund Committee therefore was to implement the appropriate 
system that would allow for the transfer of a cash grant to all deprived South African 
children.  The trade-off was the very low value of the grant which was valued at just 
R100 when first introduced.  Moreover, the grant only covered children under seven 
years and consequently the coverage was also substantially less than the SMG.  The fact 
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that the CSG would be means-tested instead of being a universal transfer further 
restricted the number of children who could benefit.   
 
A key objective of the Lund Committee was to put in place the appropriate mechanisms 
that would allow for incremental increases in the value of the grant (Lund 2008).  
Analysis of the value of the grant over the past 10 years demonstrates that this objective 
has been achieved as it has increased 140 per cent to R240.  Furthermore, as discussed 
above, coverage has increased significantly with the age range of eligible children being 
progressively extended.  Thus, whilst much controversy surrounded the introduction of 
the CSG and the phasing out of the SMG, it would appear that the CSG has been highly 
successful in contributing towards the economic wellbeing of millions of South African 
children. 
 
Several criticisms of the grant persist, however, most notably that the value of the grant, 
whilst higher than at inception, is still very low.  Furthermore, the threshold amount for 
the income test is set very low meaning that many vulnerable children are excluded.  As 
of 1 April 2009, a single mother must earn no more than 28,000 Rands per annum to 
qualify for the CSG (Department of Social Development 2009). Administrative problems 
have also resulted in mothers having to incur high costs to access the system, and have 
made the CSG an unreliable source of income (see Bonthuys 2008a; Bonthuys 2008b for 
a discussion of these problems). 
 
Another major criticism of the CSG is that it does not explicitly include a support 
component for the primary caregiver (normally the mother) of the children, and thus 
ignores the contribution of women towards childrearing (Goldblatt 2005).  The advantage 
of the CSG is that it operates within the framework of ‘Follow the child’ hence can be 
accessed by a child’s caregiver irrespective of whether they are the child’s parent or not.  
However, the CSG cannot be accessed by primary caretakers who are less than 16 years 
old and with the high level of teenage pregnancy in South Africa, this age limit means 
that many needy single mothers and their children are currently excluded from the child 
grant system (Jewkes et al. 2009; Bonthuys 2008b).  As discussed in section 2.3, the 
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grant does not currently cover children who are older than 15 and whilst the government 
intends rolling out the system so that it is available to all children under the age of 18, 
this process will take at least three more years to complete (ANC 2009).  Again, this 
means that many needy South African children are not presently being assisted by the 
CSG system.   
 
Other mechanisms designed to assist children and mothers include feeding schemes at 
schools as well as free healthcare provided to pregnant women and children under the age 
of seven (Bonthuys 2008b).  Women are also entitled to four months of maternity leave, 
which can commence one month before their due date (Department of Labour 2009).  
Whilst these signify improvements to the system in that they recognize the role of women 
in childbirth and childrearing, they fall short of fully compensating mothers for their role 
in raising their children.  For example, the South African Health Ministry recommends a 
mother nurses her child for the first six months without giving the child any other form of 
food or drink and that a child should be fed eight to 12 times a day  (Department of 
Health 2009).  Where a mother has to work, they recommend that the baby be given 
expressed milk.   In giving mothers only four months of maternity leave, it would appear 
that the government has not accounted for the strain and fatigue that can be associated 
with nursing a child.  Again, it is a function that a mother is just expected to perform, 
whilst simultaneously carrying out all other duties at optimal levels of productivity.   
 
For many single mothers, the only way of obtaining ongoing financial assistance is via 
the private maintenance system  Many single mothers earn more than 28,000 Rands 
(the threshold amount to qualify for the CSG) but still struggle to support themselves 
and their children.  This highlights the need for the rapid improvement of the private 
maintenance system.  As noted by Lund (2008: 39): 
 
“it is important to attempt to reform the system and to reach those who can afford 




2.6 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have discussed reasons why women, on average, receive less income 
than men.  These differences largely stem from the gendered division of labour within the 
household which, as explained by Becker (1985), has resulted in women being more 
likely to engage in household production whilst men further their careers within the job 
market.  Lower rates of labour force participation and greater job discontinuity have 
resulted in female wage rates, levels of human capital investment and job opportunities, 
on average, being inferior to those of men. 
 
Women in South Africa, on average, continue to have a lower economic status than men.  
Whilst there have been increases in female labour force participation, women are less 
likely to be employed, and to earn as much as males.  Moreover, they are more dependent 
on grant income, the value of which tends to be substantially lower than market earnings.  
A major reason for a higher poverty rate among women is the growth of female-headed 
households, and the consequent lack of support from an income-earning male.  Given 
these developments, single mothers in South Africa would be expected to be considerably 
worse off than their married counterparts who have a male partner to support the family. 
 
Internationally, there has been an increase in single motherhood (Heuveline et al. 2003).  
Whilst the true extent of single motherhood in South Africa is unknown, research on 
fatherhood shows that an increasing proportion of children live without their father which 
suggests that growing numbers live only with their mother.  In light of gender differences 
in access to resources, these women would require financial assistance to support their 
families.  Many countries around the world have introduced programmes to increase 
single parents’ income levels in order to try and smooth out disparities among different 
family types. 
 
Nations differ in the support they offer to single mothers but a common characteristic is 
that single-mother families are generally worse off than other family types.  The notable 
exception is Sweden where a relatively equitable labour market and well targeted social 
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welfare programmes have significantly improved the economic status of single mothers.  
The current mechanisms in South Africa appear to offer very little tangible support to 
single mothers.  The little public assistance that is available benefits only those with 
relatively low income levels and the value of the grant is extremely small.  The private 
maintenance system in South Africa is highly inefficient and in many cases the costs of 
engaging with the system outweigh the benefits.  The lack of effective solutions in South 
Africa would suggest that single mothers are significantly worse off than married 
mothers. 
 
Several studies have proposed changes to the South African maintenance system in 
order to improve its performance (Bonthuys 2008a; Lund 2008). One suggestion has 
been to introduce a set formula to determine maintenance.  As discussed in section 2.4, 
an amount calculated via a formula is more objective and is more likely to be in line 
with a father’s ability to pay.  Forging closer links with the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) would also greatly improve the maintenance office’s investigative 
ability and powers of enforcement.  The mere threat of a SARS investigation may 
provide sufficient incentive for a father to reveal his true income and pay the 
appropriate level of maintenance.  Furthermore, the malfunctioning maintenance 
system could benefit from learning how SARS, as a relatively well-functioning 
government department, has managed to achieve its organizational efficiency. 
 
Another remedy with regard to enforcement, would be to ensure that punishment for 
maintenance default is swift and severe.  Thus, once an order is granted, a parent 
cannot reduce the amount paid unless they have obtained the court’s permission to do 
so (for example in the event of unemployment).  If they pay less maintenance without 
having approached the courts first, they should face harsh punishment either in the 
form of financial penalties, or imprisonment over alternate weekends.  Section 31 of 
the Maintenance Acts specifically incorporates these types of penalties (see Appendix 
2B) (Department of Justice 1998b).  This may help to overcome the problem of fathers 
just stopping maintenance payments of their own volition as they know that they are 
unlikely to be punished.  If a father knows that he faces harsh consequences if he halts 
 35
payment on all or part of his maintenance obligation, he may be less inclined to renege 
on his financial responsibilities.  
 
A significant improvement to the system would be forcing fathers to pay in line with their 
ability to pay.  This would ensure a child achieves a similar standard of living to what 
they would have enjoyed, had there been no separation or divorce.  Forcing a father to 
pay according to his means would therefore ensure a child is not penalised by a 
relationship breakdown. As noted, fathers frequently pay for a smaller proportion of their 
child’s expenses despite, on average, having far more resources than mothers (Bonthuys 
2008a; Budlender 2005).  Requiring fathers to pay to the full extent that they are able to 
pay will alleviate this unfair burden on mothers. 
 
Reforming the private maintenance system will indirectly benefit those children whose 
parents are too poor to pay for them.  These children rely on government programmes 
and as with all public interventions, these programme require funding.  When fathers 
with means are forced to pay maintenance, this allows government to target programmes 
towards more needy children.  A child whose father pays maintenance may be able to 
access education and health care in the private sector.  More state resources will then be 
available to provide assistance - whether in the form of school feeding schemes, better 
quality education, improved health care services or otherwise - to those children whose 
parents cannot afford to pay.  Fathers with means who do not pay for their own children 
effectively reduce state resources for those children who actually need them. 
 
Government can try to overcome the maintenance default problem by continuously 
emphasizing and prioritizing the financial role a father plays in his child’s life.  This is 
particularly relevant in South Africa where women, on average, continue to earn less 
than men.  Recent studies have sought to encourage a more engaged form of 
fatherhood, where men move beyond their roles as protectors and providers and also 
engage energetically and affectionately with their children (Morrell 2006).  An 
unintentional consequence of this research may be that some fathers distort these 
efforts to underplay their roles as providers.  They may attempt to create a façade of 
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caring by actively pursuing contact with their children whilst simultaneously 
exploiting the inefficiencies of the maintenance system to pay as little as possible for 
their children.  The legal system unintentionally provides these fathers with the forum 
to do so by treating child contact as a separate issue from child maintenance.    
 
Internationally, the trend towards shared custody has resulted in mothers receiving less 
financial support from fathers.  As discussed in section 2.4, this is problematic in that 
women, on average, continue to have less access to resources than men, thus on 
average children will be economically disadvantaged when they are with their 
mothers.  Moreover, if financial incentives are driving fathers to seek more contact 
with their children, this contact may not be in the best interests of their children. 
 
A highly effective solution would be increasing the education of women not only in 
terms of increasing their skills level, but also in terms of advising them on what 
constitutes a healthy relationship.  Alerting women to the potential consequences of a 
bad relationship may increase their chances of choosing a better partner and thereby 
reduce their likelihood of having to engage with the family law system.  Advising 
women of the inefficiencies in the private maintenance system and the trends in child 
custody before they are in a position where they are forced to engage with these 
systems may prevent many women from entering unstable unions and then having to 
incur the numerous costs associated with a relationship breakdown.   
 
In sum, income poverty has become an increasingly gendered phenomenon in South 
Africa since 1994 (Posel and Rogan 2009a).  Furthermore, in light of the limited financial 
support provided to single mothers, it is likely these women will be particularly 
vulnerable to poverty and will therefore require carefully targeted interventions to 
improve their economic wellbeing. The next chapters explore the economic status of 
mothers by marital status, and in particular, whether single-mother families are indeed 
worse off than other types of families in South Africa. 
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Appendix 2A: Section 15 of the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
 
 “15      Duty of parents to support their children  
    (1)   Without derogating from the law relating to the liability of persons to  
  support children who are unable to support themselves, a    
  maintenance order for the maintenance of a child is directed at the   
  enforcement of the common law duty of the child's parents to support that  
  child, as the duty in question exists at the time of the issue of the   
  maintenance order and is expected to continue.  
 
    (2)  The duty extends to such support as a child reasonably requires for his or  
  her proper living and upbringing, and includes the provision of food,  
  clothing, accommodation, medical care and education.  
 
    (3)  (a)  Without derogating from the law relating to the support of children, the  
    maintenance court shall, in determining the amount to be paid as   
    maintenance in respect of a child, take into consideration-  
        (i)    that the duty of supporting a child is an obligation which the parents have  
  incurred jointly;  
        (ii)   that the parents' respective shares of such obligation are apportioned  
  between them according to their respective means; and  
        (iii)  that the duty exists, irrespective of whether a child is born in or out of  
  wedlock or is born of a first or subsequent marriage.  
 
     (b)   Any amount so determined shall be such amount as the maintenance court  
   may consider fair in all the circumstances of the case.  
 
    (4)   As from the commencement of this Act, no provision of any law to the  
  effect that any obligation incurred by a parent in respect of a child of a  
  first marriage shall have priority over any obligation incurred by that  
  parent in respect of any other  child shall be of any force and effect.”  
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Appendix 2B: Section 31 of the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
 
 “31      Offences relating to maintenance orders  
    (1)   Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), any person who fails to make  
  any particular payment in accordance with a maintenance order shall be  
  guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment  
  for a period not exceeding one year or to such imprisonment without the  
  option of a fine. 
 
    (2)  If the defence is raised in any prosecution for an offence under this  
  section that any failure to pay maintenance in accordance with a   
  maintenance order was due to lack of means on the part of the person  
  charged, he or she shall not merely on the grounds of such defence be  
  entitled to an acquittal if it is proved that the failure was due to his or her  
  unwillingness to work or misconduct.  
 
    (3)   If the name of a person stated in a maintenance order as the person against 
   whom the maintenance order has been made corresponds substantially to  
   the name of the particular person prosecuted for an offence under this  
   section, any copy of the maintenance order certified as a true copy by a  
   person who purports to be the registrar or clerk of the court or other officer 
   having the custody of the records of the court in the Republic where the  
   maintenance order was made, shall on its production be prima facie proof  
   of the fact that the maintenance order was made against the person so  
   prosecuted.   
 
    (4)   If a person has been convicted of an offence under this section, the  
  maintenance officer may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary  
  contained in any law, furnish that person's personal particulars to any  
  business which has as its object the granting of credit or is involved in the  
  credit rating of persons.”  
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Chapter Three 




A key aspect to investigating poverty levels in South Africa is to determine the economic 
status of single mothers and their families.  Internationally it has been found that these 
families are particularly vulnerable to poverty (see for example Philo et al. 2009; 
Christopher et al. 2002; Wong et al. 1993), so it is important for South African 
policymakers to know whether domestic single-mother families are similarly at risk.  
Chapter Three explores this issue by undertaking a descriptive data analysis which 
compares the wellbeing of single mothers to that of married mothers.   
 
A major difference between these two groups of mothers is that married mothers are 
expected to benefit from the income of a male partner whereas single mothers are not.   
As discussed in Chapter Two, a reason why females in South Africa are economically 
worse off compared to males, is that females are less likely to live in a household that  
includes an income-earning male (Posel and Rogan 2009a).  This finding would suggest 
that single mothers would be worse off compared to their married counterparts.  In this 
chapter, I investigate descriptively whether the absence of an income-earning male 
partner has an adverse effect on the wellbeing of single mothers.  This descriptive 
analysis will not be able to prove that single motherhood and the lack of an income-
earning male partner cause a woman to be economically worse off, but it does provide 
important insights into this relationship. 
 
In section 3.2 I discuss the data and sample used in Chapter Three, as well as the 
implications of the sample restrictions.  Section 3.3 compares the individual and 
household characteristics of the sample of single and married mothers.  In section 3.4 I 
summarise the findings and conclude the chapter. 
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3.2 Data and definitions 
 
This study uses nationally representative household survey data to explore the economic 
status of women who are mothers. There are two methods by which mothers can be 
identified through information collected in household surveys.  First, mothers can be 
identified via birth module information where women are asked whether they have had a 
live birth.  This method would identify mothers with biological children, whether or not 
they are co-resident with their children.  A second method would use household 
relationship questions.  A person can either be asked to identify their mother if she 
resides in the household, or they may be asked their relationship to the household head 
which can reveal motherhood status.  Using relationship questions would impose a co-
residency requirement on motherhood hence only a subset of mothers would be 
identified. 
 
In South Africa, the only nationally representative dataset released by Statistics South 
Africa which makes it possible to identify all biological mothers is the General 
Household Survey (GHS) 2002.  The GHS 2002 contains a birth module which asked all 
women aged 12 to 50 about children ever born, the age and sex of children and the order 
of births.  However, the GHS 2002 cannot be used for a study of the economic status of 
mothers. This is because the survey only collects individual information on income 
earned through employment, and it is not possible to identify the value of non-labour 
income received by individuals in the household. An important component of this non-
labour income is social grant income. A distinguishing characteristic of the post-apartheid 
period in South Africa has been the dramatic expansion in the social welfare system, and 
in particular, the extension of the social pension and the Child Support Grant (Seekings 
2007; Van der Berg et al. 2007).  
 
For this reason, I do not use the GHS 2002 in this study. Rather, I use a more recent 
round of the General Household Survey, the GHS 2006, which has the considerable 
advantage of collecting information on the individual receipt of all grant income.  The 
GHS 2006 collects binary information on whether individual household members receive 
 41
specific social grants. To generate grant income, I assign the maximum value of the grant 
to grant receipt. For example, the state pension, disability grant and care dependency 
grant were all valued at R820 in 2006, whilst the Child Support Grant was R190 and the 
foster care grant was R590.8   
 
A problem with the GHS 2006, however, is that it does not have information on other 
sources of income such as private maintenance receipts and private pensions.  This is 
particularly problematic when researching the economic status of single mothers as 
private maintenance payments would need to be included in the analysis.  As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the South African maintenance system is notoriously inefficient and of 
relevance to this study is the extent to which maintenance receipts contribute towards the 
household income of a single-mother family.  This, in turn, would provide insights into 
whether a single mother does indeed bear the financial burden of childrearing.  To 
address this data limitation, I augment the measure of household income using 
information collected on household expenditure (see also Posel and Rogan 2009a).  For 
households that report total household income which is less than their total household 
expenditure, I use household expenditure to approximate the household’s total resources.  
The household’s resources will be estimated to be the midpoint of the expenditure 
category within which the household’s expenditure falls.9  This adjustment will estimate 
the portion of household expenditure funded by “other” income sources, for example, 
private maintenance receipts. 
 
The GHS 2006 does not contain a birth module and therefore all women who are 
biological mothers cannot be identified. Rather, only a subset of mothers can be 
distinguished using a maternal relationship question. The GHS 2006 asks individuals to 
indicate the person living in their household who is their biological mother and 
                                                 
8 Incomplete information on the value of the “grant in aid” and “social relief” precludes the inclusion of 
these transfers within the analysis, but the number of recipients of these grants is very small and therefore is 
not expected to have much effect on results. 
9 For households that report monthly expenditure greater than or equal to R10,000 – the highest 
expenditure category - and where this expenditure exceeds total household income, the household will be 
recorded as having income equal to R10,000. 
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accordingly, only women who are living in the same household as their biological 
children will be recognized as mothers.  
 
Working with this sample will underestimate motherhood as it will not include mothers 
who are not co-resident with their children. Furthermore, because the maternal 
relationship question in the GHS 2006 enquires about biological motherhood, non-
biological mothers, such as adoptive and foster mothers who are co-resident with their 
children, are also likely to be excluded from the sample. 
 
3.2.1 The sample of mothers 
 
In South Africa, many mothers, particularly African mothers, do not live with their 
children (van der Stoep 2008). Amoateng et al. (2007) explore the living arrangements of 
children under 12 using 1996 and 2001 Population Census data from Statistics South 
Africa as well as survey data.  They find that about 90 per cent of White children lived 
with parents whilst only about half of African children lived with their parents.   
 
A range of socio-economic, political and cultural factors have lead to many African 
mothers not being co-resident with their children.  Marital rates among African women 
are very low and have been declining in South Africa (Posel and Rogan 2009a; Kalule-
Sabiti et al. 2007).  This has resulted in many African mothers not having the financial 
support of a male partner.  There is also evidence of the increase in female-headed 
households as well as the relative deprivation of these households (Posel and Rogan 
2009a; Armstrong et al. 2008; Hoogeveen and Özler 2006; Budlender 2005; Rose and 
Charlton 2002; Woolard and Leibbrandt 1999).   Lower levels of household income have 
necessitated many African mothers to become labour market participants.  Magwaza 
(2003) finds that lower household income levels in African households compared to 
White households, have increased the need for African mothers to work, compared to 
their White counterparts.   
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African women have tended to be concentrated in domestic work (Casale and Posel 
2005) which in many instances has lead to mothers residing at their place of employment 
whilst their children have been cared for by other family members in their household of 
origin.  This arrangement of domestic workers living away from their children is a legacy 
of South Africa’s apartheid system where the Group Areas Act prohibited African 
women from settling in typically White areas with their children (Zulu and Sibanda 
2005).  Whilst these laws no longer exist, Posel and Casale (2006) find that there has 
actually been an increase in female migration in the post-apartheid period.  This 
phenomenon of African female labour migration has therefore lead to many African 
mothers not being co-resident with their children. Posel and van der Stoep (2008) show 
that in 2002, about 14 per cent of African mothers who were of reproductive age were not 
co-resident with at least one of their children.  In contrast to this, only 4.5 per cent of 
mothers from other race groups were not living with at least one of their children.   
 
Using data from the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development 
(PSLSD), and from the 1995, 1997 and 1999 October Household Surveys, Posel and 
Casale (2003) find that migrant African females are less likely to be married. Moreover, 
Amoateng et al. (2007) note the custom of young, urban, unmarried African women 
sending their children to live with their parents and grandparents in rural areas.  Posel and 
van der Stoep (2008) analyse data from the GHS 2002 to confirm that not co-resident 
mothers are more likely to be unmarried.   Given that their absence from the household of 
origin is often due to them seeking out better work opportunities, the labour force 
participation rate among not co-resident mothers would be expected to be relatively high.  
This is confirmed by Posel and van der Stoep (2008) who show that not co-resident 
mothers are much more likely to be labour force participants than co-resident mothers.  
Thus the sample of co-resident mothers identified in the GHS 2006 is likely to be a non-
random sample of mothers that underestimates the labour force participation rate and 
income levels of mothers, in particular single African mothers.  
 
Mothers who are not co-resident with their children are unlikely to have their labour force 
participation constrained by childcare commitments.  Co-resident mothers, in contrast, 
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are more likely to have day-to-day childcare responsibilities that keep them out of the 
labour force, or that make it possible to engage only in part-time employment.  
Furthermore, given their childcare duties, co-resident mothers would be expected to have 
lower energy levels than not co-resident mothers.  As noted by Becker (1985), childcare 
is effort-intensive and can drain a women’s energy which would impact negatively on 
their labour force participation.  Moreover, if co-resident mothers are in employment, 
lower energy levels due to their childcare duties may impact negatively on their 
productivity which would reduce their ability to find better-paying jobs and would reduce 
their promotion prospects.  These factors would have an adverse effect on the income 
earned by co-resident mothers.10  The restriction on co-residency therefore makes it 
possible to compare how, among a group of mothers who face childcare commitments, 
the economic status of mothers differs by their marital status. 
 
Unobservable characteristics, like motivation and talent, may also be displayed by a 
particular subset of mothers.  Agüero and Marks (2008) note that these two factors may 
impact negatively on a woman’s initial decision to have children as more motivated and 
talented individuals with greater professional aspirations may not want childrearing to 
interfere with their career.  Similarly, these characteristics may influence a mother’s 
decision not to co-reside with her children.  Mothers with greater work ambitions and 
aptitudes may be motivated to move away from their children and household of origin, to 
seek better job opportunities.  The implication of these unobservable characteristics is 
that a sample of co-resident mothers may have lower work aspirations and hence exhibit 
a lower labour force participation rate (or lower earnings if employed) than a sample 
which includes not co-resident mothers. 
 
In sum, the group of co-resident mothers identified by the GHS 2006 is likely to be a 
non-random sample of mothers.  Given the differences between co-resident and not co-
resident mothers, the sample is likely to underestimate the labour force participation rate 
                                                 
10 As a counterargument, many South African households, particularly among Africans, consist of extended 
families, which can increase the number of potential caregivers for children (Amoateng et al. 2007; Bray 
and Brandt 2007; Magwaza 2003).  Grand-parents, other relatives and even neighbours can care for 
children whilst a co-resident mother works.  This may partially negate the negative effects of childcare on a 
co-resident mothers labour force participation, productivity and income-earning ability.  
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and income levels of all mothers.  Moreover, as not co-resident mothers are more likely 
to be single and African, these variables are more likely to be underestimated for single 
African mothers.   
 
A further implication of using the GHS 2006 is that it asks respondents to identify their 
“biological” mother which, by definition, would exclude foster or adoptive mothers.  
There may be instances where an enumerator did not make this explicit and respondents 
may have recorded a foster or adoptive mother as their biological mother.  However, it is 
likely that many surrogate or foster mothers would not be identified as mothers in the 
GHS 2006. Again, this exclusion is likely to underestimate motherhood particularly 
among African women, and particularly in the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.   
 
The data limitations, notwithstanding, the sample of mothers identified using the GHS 
2006, can be used to gain important insights into the economic status of co-resident 
mothers, and in particular, to compare the wellbeing of mothers with childcare 
responsibilities by their marital status. The sample of co-resident biological mothers is 
restricted to those women aged 19 to 65.  The younger age limit reflects the fact that 
South Africa experiences a high rate of teenage pregnancy (Jewkes et al. 2009; Wood 
and Jewkes 2006).  These teenage mothers may still be living with their own parents and 
attending school, and as such would not be labour market participants.  Co-resident 
children are restricted to the age group of 18 and younger.  The focus of this dissertation 
is on mothers whose children are still dependent on them.  Children older than 18 may 
actually be contributing income to the household and therefore are less likely to represent 
a pure economic cost to the household.  Given this age restriction on children, older 
women form a very small percentage of the sample of mothers.11    
 
Table 3.1 shows the proportion and counts of all women aged from 19 to 65 with at least 
one co-resident biological child aged 18 or younger.  For simplicity, I will refer to this 
subset of mothers as co-resident mothers.  The proportion of women who are co-resident 
                                                 
11 In 2006, less than one per cent of the sample of mothers aged from 19 to 65 living with at least one child 
aged 18 or younger, was older than 60. 
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mothers is calculated as (the number of co-resident mothers aged 19 to 65)/(total female 
population aged 19 to 65).  
     
According to the weighted sample, in 2006, approximately 53 per cent of all women aged 
19 to 65 were co-resident mothers.   
 
Table 3. 1: The proportion and counts of co-resident mothers, 2006 






Counts of co-resident mothers 15,503 (88) 
7,158,916 
(71,100) 
Counts of all women aged 19 to 65 31,042 (118) 
13,526,607 
(96,560) 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design.  Accounting for clustering does not affect the magnitude of the weighted estimate but it 
affects the standard error. 
 
In Table 3.2 I show a break-down of the weighted sample by race.  I only include those 
mothers for whom race data are non-missing.12  Coloureds and Africans report the 
highest proportion of co-resident mothers with approximately 55 per cent whilst Whites 
report the lowest with just under 41 per cent.  Among Indian females in the sample, about 
48 per cent are co-resident mothers.  As noted earlier, the co-residency requirement for 
motherhood means that the incidence of motherhood will be underestimated particularly 








                                                 
12 Information on race is missing for approximately 5,829 (weighted) co-resident mothers.  The reason for 
missing data may be enumerator error or mothers may belong to racial groups not specified in the 
questionnaire. 
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Table 3. 2: The proportion and counts of co-resident mothers by race, 2006 
 African Coloured Indian White 














Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design.  Accounting for clustering does not affect the magnitude of the weighted estimate but it 
affects the standard error.  Estimates only include co-resident mothers for whom race information is non-
missing.  
 
In Table 3.3 I use the weighted sample to differentiate co-resident mothers by race and 
marital status.  I exclude those mothers for whom race or marital status data are missing.  
Mothers who are identified as ‘married’ are those who indicated their marital status to be 
‘married’ or ‘living together like husband and wife’, whilst ‘single’ denotes mothers who 
are reported as being either ‘divorced or separated’, ‘widowed’ or ‘never married’.    
 
Table 3.3 shows that whilst co-resident mothers are more likely to be married, more than 
44 per cent of co-resident mothers are single.  These figures suggest that there is a high 
incidence of single motherhood in South Africa.  Indian and White co-resident mothers 
are far more likely to be married with only about 11 per cent being single.  In comparison 
to other race groups, Africans are the least likely to be married; indeed they are as likely 
to be married as unmarried.  Furthermore, given the co-residency sample restriction, and 
the fact that not co-resident mothers are more likely to be single African women, the 










Table 3. 3: The proportion and counts of co-resident mothers by marital status and 
race, 2006 
























































Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, counts are on the bottom half of each cell. Weighted estimates 
are obtained by accounting for clustering in the survey design.  Estimates only include co-resident mothers 
for whom race and marital status information is non-missing. 
* indicates a significant difference in proportions and counts across single co-resident mothers and married 
co-resident mothers using a 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to investigate whether the economic status of 
single mothers is different to that of their married counterparts.  Political policies during 
apartheid were designed to benefit Whites, and therefore have resulted in an inequitable 
resource distribution with Africans, on average, being worse off than Whites.  To provide 
a comprehensive overview of the economic status of single mothers, I investigate the 
African and White population groups, with the latter group expected to be better off.  
Also of importance, however, is to examine the effect of marital status on mothers within 
each population group to see if single mothers are worse off than their married 
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counterparts within these groups.  For the remainder of this chapter, results are reported 
for the weighted sample of African and White co-resident mothers, excluding those for 
whom race and marital status data are missing.  The weighted sample, therefore, consists 
of 5,676,181 African co-resident mothers of whom 2,826,646 are single and 594,230 
White co-resident mothers of whom 66,871 are single. 
 
3.3 Comparing the characteristics of single and married co-resident mothers 
 
3.3.1 Individual characteristics of co-resident mothers by marital status 
 
Table 3.4 shows the individual characteristics of African and White co-resident mothers.  
Single co-resident mothers from both racial groups on average, are younger and less 
likely to have tertiary qualifications than their married counterparts.  This is consistent 
with findings by Pandey and Kim (2008) that single mothers in the USA tend to be 
younger and less educated than married mothers.  A key aspect to comparing co-resident 
mothers by their marital status is to compare their labour market status and their average 
earnings.  In this dissertation I use the broad definition of the labour force which includes 
the employed, the searching unemployed and the non-searching unemployed.  The reason 
for this is that I recognize the possibility that there may be unemployed mothers who 
would be prepared to work but who have become discouraged because of very high rates 
of unemployment and hence have given up actively searching for work. 
 
Among African women, single co-resident mothers are significantly more likely than 
married mothers to be unemployed.  However, the difference in the proportions employed 
by marital status is not significant.  This is perhaps surprising as a higher proportion of 
single mothers would be expected to be working compared to married mothers.  Single 
mothers lack the financial support of a co-resident spouse and are more likely to be 
household heads than married mothers; hence, they would have a greater responsibility to 
earn income.  Given that migrant mothers are excluded from the sample, however, the 
employment rate of African single mothers in particular, is likely to be underestimated.  
Another reason for the lower than expected employment rate among single mothers is 
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that compared to married mothers, there is a higher incidence of teenage pregnancy.  
Teenage mothers are more likely to be living at home and not working than older 
mothers.   Furthermore, African single co-resident mothers may be living in households 
where other family members provide financial support.  Table 3.4 shows that more than 
half of single African mothers are not the head of their household which may indicate 
that other family members are responsible for supporting the family financially. 
 
The significantly higher unemployment rate among African single co-resident mothers 
may be explained by the fact that they do not have a live-in partner to assist with 
childcare duties.  Childcare responsibilities may limit the employment opportunities 
available to these women.  However, as a proportion of the unemployed, approximately 
44 per cent of single co-resident mothers are non-searching, compared to just under 52 
per cent of married co-resident mothers.  This would suggest that childcare is a greater 
impediment to active job search for married co-resident mothers.  This may be indicative 
of the fact that a single mother has a greater need to work and is forced to make 
alternative childcare arrangements to search for work.  
 
African single co-resident mothers are more likely than their married counterparts to live 
in rural areas where traditionally job opportunities have been inferior to those in 
metropolitan areas (Burger and Woolard 2005).  This may also explain the higher 
unemployment rate among single mothers.  Moreover, this is likely to explain partially 
why employed married co-resident mothers earn, on average, over 34 per cent more than 
employed single co-resident mothers.  Lower levels of tertiary education among single 
mothers, necessitating that they work in lower-paying jobs is another possible reason for 
this large difference in earnings.  Again, it is important to note that not co-resident single 
African mothers are excluded from this analysis due to the sample restriction and for the 
reasons outlined in section 3.2.1, this may have resulted in the economic status of African 
single mothers being underestimated. 
 
In contrast to African women who are co-resident mothers, single White women who are 
co-resident mothers are significantly more likely to be employed than White married co-
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resident mothers. Among White women, the employment rate for single co-resident 
mothers is approximately 85 per cent, compared to just under 67 per cent for married co-
resident mothers.  Single co-resident White mothers are also less likely to be unemployed 
than their married counterparts, however, the difference is not statistically significant.  
Moreover there is not a significant difference in individual earnings among White 
mothers by marital status. White single co-resident mothers may earn the same or even 
slightly more, on average, than their married counterparts; however, they are also more 
likely to be the primary income provider in the family.13  The salaries of married co-
resident mothers are likely to be complemented by the earnings of a partner.   
 
A comparison of labour market indicators among African and White co-resident mothers 
reveals that White women are considerably better off than African women.  This 
difference reflects the results of historical inequalities in educational and job 
opportunities due to apartheid-era policies.  Whilst significant steps have been taken to 
redress these imbalances, inequalities still persist.  Resource shifts to traditionally African 
schools have not succeeded in smoothing out quality differences in education between 
those and traditionally White schools (Van der Berg 2007).  Furthermore, empowerment 
legislation designed to improve job prospects for all Africans has been criticized for only 
enriching a minority (Besada 2007).  Africans therefore continue to have less access to 
resources, as evidenced by the significantly lower levels of employment and average 








                                                 
13 The head of the household is often the primary income provider (Posel and Rogan 2009a) and in 2006, 
approximately 60 per cent of employed White single co-resident mothers were household heads compared 
to just over seven per cent of their employed married counterparts. 
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Table 3. 4: Individual characteristics of co-resident mothers by marital status, 2006 
 Single Married 
 African 
Metropolitan area 0.248 (0.009) 0.291* (0.010) 
Age 33.532 (0.162)    37.053* (0.171) 
Proportion of mothers aged 19 0.018 (0.002) 0.006* (0.002) 
Proportion of mothers who are heads 
of households 0.445 (0.008) 0.201* (0.007) 
Highest level of education:     
No schooling 0.077 (0.004) 0.113* (0.005) 
Grade 1 to grade 7 0.208 (0.007) 0.260* (0.008) 
Grade 8 to grade 11 0.432 (0.008) 0.372* (0.009) 
Matric 0.219 (0.007) 0.160* (0.007) 
Degree or diploma 0.062 (0.005) 0.092* (0.006) 
Employment status and income:     
Proportion employed 0.315 (0.008) 0.314 (0.008) 
Proportion unemployed 0.489 (0.008) 0.399* (0.009) 
Proportion of unemployed who are 
non-searching 0.436 (0.012) 0.518* (0.015) 
Average monthly earnings from 
employment 1860.812 (85.423) 2497.910* (120.972) 
 White 
Metropolitan area 0.659 (0.059) 0.559 (0.027) 
Age 36.333 (1.408) 37.128 (0.437) 
Proportion of mothers aged 19 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Proportion of mothers who are heads 
of households 0.535 (0.072) 0.058* (0.012) 
Highest level of education:     
No schooling 0.005 (0.005) 0.000 (0.000) 
Grade 1 to grade 7 0.007 (0.007) 0.012 (0.006) 
Grade 8 to grade 11 0.259 (0.060) 0.187 (0.020) 
Matric 0.450 (0.072) 0.456 (0.028) 
Degree or diploma 0.279 (0.064) 0.342 (0.027) 
Employment status and income:     
Proportion employed 0.854 (0.047) 0.669* (0.026) 
Proportion unemployed 0.042 (0.020) 0.094 (0.016) 
Proportion of unemployed who are 
non-searching 0.389 (0.245) 0.529 (0.091) 
Average monthly earnings from 
employment 8771.443 (2041.357) 8034.942 (497.466) 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design. Estimates only include co-resident mothers for whom race and marital status information 
is non-missing.  The broad unemployment rate includes both the searching and the non-searching 
unemployed. 
* indicates a significant difference in means and proportions across single co-resident mothers and married 
co-resident mothers using a 95 percent confidence interval.  
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3.3.2 Household characteristics of co-resident mothers by marital status 
 
To gain greater insight into the economic status of co-resident mothers, it is necessary to 
look also at household characteristics.  The size of a household relative to its total 
resources can be used to measure average access to resources in the household. African 
single co-resident mothers live in significantly larger households than African married 
co-resident mothers.  Thus total resources in the households in which African single co-
resident mother live would have to be shared among a larger group of people.  With 
regards to White women, however, there is very little difference in household size when 
comparing the two groups of mothers.   This is perhaps surprising given that single-
mother households do not include a male adult partner.  Further inspection of the data 
reveals that although, on average, there are significantly fewer men living in single co-
resident mothers’ households, there are significantly more adult females compared to the 
households in which married co-resident mothers live.  
 
Table 3.5 shows that compared to married co-resident mothers, both African and White 
single co-resident mothers live with fewer employed males older than 18.  This would be 
expected given that single co-resident mothers do not have a co-resident male partner.  
Single co-resident mothers also live with more women over 18 who are employed which 
would suggest that single-mother households are more dependent on women’s earnings.  
This is reinforced by the fact that both African and White single mothers are significantly 
more likely to live in female-headed households than their married counterparts.  Given 
that women, on average, earn less than men, living in a household with employed women 
may not provide the same level of financial security as living with an employed male 
partner, ceteris paribus.  
 
African single co-resident mothers live in households that include a greater number of 
unemployed individuals – particularly unemployed women – than African married co-
resident mothers.  However, among White mothers, there is not a large difference in the 
number of unemployed household residents when comparing single and married co-
resident mothers’ households.  The difference in the number of employed persons in 
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White and African households may be indicative of the racial differences in education 
levels and access to employment. Whilst both African and White single co-resident 
mothers have the same need to work, White women would have traditionally benefited 
from better employment prospects than African women. 
  
In general, single co-resident mothers live with more pensioners which would suggest 
greater dependence on pension and grant income.  Moreover, African single mothers are 
more likely than White single mothers to live with women and men over 59 and 64 
respectively.  This may indicate a greater reliance on pension income particularly in the 























Table 3. 5: Household characteristics of co-resident mothers by marital status, 2006 
 Single Married 
 African 
Proportion of households with 
female heads 0.801 (0.007) 0.250* (0.007) 
Household composition – 
Average:14     
Household size 6.073 (0.043) 5.278* (0.039) 
Number of women over 18 2.160 (0.018) 1.434* (0.013) 
Number of men over 18 0.772 (0.015) 1.153* (0.013) 
Number of employed women over 18 0.557 (0.012) 0.371* (0.010) 
Number of employed men over 18 0.194 (0.008) 0.627* (0.010) 
Number of unemployed women 
between 18 and 60 0.934 (0.015) 0.588* (0.012) 
Number of unemployed men between 
18 & 65 0.330 (0.010) 0.290* (0.010) 
Number of women over the age of 59 
in household 0.223 (0.007) 0.074* (0.004) 
Number of men over the age of 64 in 
household 0.065 (0.004) 0.048* (0.003) 
Number of children 18 and younger  3.139 (0.028) 2.688* (0.028) 
 White 
Proportion of households with 
female heads 0.717 (0.064) 0.062* (0.014) 
Household composition – Average:     
Household size 3.860 (0.237) 4.057 (0.052) 
Number of women over 18 1.693 (0.105) 1.145* (0.019) 
Number of men over 18 0.659 (0.143) 1.083* (0.019) 
Number of employed women over 18 1.263 (0.115) 0.721* (0.029) 
Number of employed men over 18 0.460 (0.120) 0.981* (0.018) 
Number of unemployed women 
between 18 and 60 0.105 (0.041) 0.112 (0.017) 
Number of unemployed men between 
18 & 65 0.030 (0.016) 0.036 (0.010) 
Number of women over the age of 59 
in household 0.121 (0.043) 0.026 (0.007) 
Number of men over the age of 64 in 
household 0.030 (0.017) 0.016 (0.005) 
Number of children 18 and younger  1.508 (0.086) 1.829 (0.045) 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design. Estimates only include co-resident mothers for whom race and marital status information 
is non-missing.  The broad unemployment rate includes both the searching and the non-searching 
unemployed. 
* indicates a significant difference in means and proportions across single co-resident mothers and married 
co-resident mothers using a 95 percent confidence interval.  
 
                                                 
14 Estimates referring to women include the co-resident mother. 
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African single co-resident mothers, on average, live in households with significantly 
more children than their married counterparts.  Furthermore, White co-resident mothers 
are likely to live with fewer children than African co-resident mothers, and there is little 
difference in the total number of co-resident children when comparing White mothers by 
marital status.  Therefore, of all co-resident mothers analysed African single women 
would be expected to be the most disadvantaged as not only do they live with more 
children, but their overall household sizes are larger.  Moreover, they are likely to live 
with fewer employed males and therefore be more dependent on the income of a woman.  
All of these factors would be expected to contribute towards them having less access to 
resources as shown in table 3.6. 
 
Among Africans, single co-resident mothers’ households are more dependent on pension 
and grant income than on earnings.  In contrast, married co-resident mothers live in 
households in which wages and salaries are the main source of income.  Married mothers 
are more likely to be able to pool their earnings with those of a male spouse which would 
provide a reason why salaries and wages are the primary income source in their 
households.  As explained further on in section 3.3.2, female earnings, on average, make 
up less than 50 per cent of the total household income of 5,778 Rands which implies that 
the earnings of a married mother’s spouse are likely to provide the primary financial 
support for the household.  In contrast, single mothers do not benefit from the earnings of 
a co-resident male partner.  Furthermore, given that single mothers, on average, live with 
more unemployed individuals than married mothers, single co-resident mothers would be 
expected to be more reliant on public transfers, as shown in Table 3.6. 
 
For all measures of average monthly household income (total, per capita, and adult 
equivalent) excluding grant income, households in which African single co-resident 
mothers live have significantly lower levels of income than households in which African 
married co-resident mothers reside.  Adult equivalent income is calculated by attaching a 
weight of one to an adult, and 0.5 to a child aged 12 or younger.  The cost of a child to a 
household is widely acknowledged to be less than the cost of an adult (Woolard and 
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Leibbrandt 1999).  For this reason, when calculating household adult equivalent income, 
a larger weighting is given to an adult than to a child. 
 
If an African co-resident mother is employed then she is likely to be better off than a 
mother who is unemployed or economically inactive, regardless of her marital status.  
However, vast differences do exist when comparing African co-resident mothers by 
marital status.  If an African married co-resident mother is employed, the per capita 
income, and adult equivalent income of her household are, on average, both over 90 per 
cent higher than those in an employed African single mother’s household.  When 
measuring the per capita and adult equivalent income for African co-resident mothers 
who are unemployed or economically inactive again these values are, on average, 
significantly higher – by at least 73 per cent - for married women.  This would suggest 
that married co-resident mothers receive considerable financial support from other 
income earning individuals, most likely their male partner.  When comparing the 
households in which single co-resident mothers live to the households of married co-
resident mothers, the differences in per capita income are more pronounced than 
differences in total income.15  This indicates that African single co-resident mothers, on 
average, live in larger households than their married counterparts.  
 
The main source of income for a White household, regardless of a mother’s marital 
status, is salaries and wages.  Only about five per cent of White households within the 
sample report other primary income sources.  Like Africans, the households in which 
White single co-resident mothers live, on average, report less monthly income for all 
measures except grant income.  When comparing employed White mothers, on average, 
per capita income is about 19 per cent higher, and adult equivalent income is about 31 per 
cent higher in married co-resident mothers’ households.  When White mothers are 
unemployed or economically inactive, differences are considerably larger: on average, per 
capita and adult equivalent income in married co-resident mothers’ households are higher 
                                                 
15 Total household income for employed African married co-resident mothers is, on average, nearly 87 per 
cent higher than that for employed African single co-resident mothers.  Total household income for 
unemployed or economically inactive African married co-resident mothers is, on average, just over 35 per 
cent higher than that for unemployed or economically inactive African single co-resident mothers.  
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by about 240 per cent and 245 per cent respectively.  Unemployed or economically 
inactive married co-resident mothers are more than likely supported by their income 
earning male partner.  The greater differences in adult equivalent income between single 
and married co-resident mothers, compared to the smaller differences in per capita 
income, indicate that White single co-resident mothers’ households, on average, consist 
of more adults and fewer children than the households of their married counterparts.  The 
vast differences in household income highlight the important role that earnings 
(particularly from income-earning males) can play in increasing the economic well-being 
























Table 3.6: Household income of co-resident mothers by marital status, 2006 
 Single Married 
 African 
Main source of income16:    
Salaries and wages 0.404 (0.008) 0.610* (0.009) 
Remittances 0.122 (0.005) 0.129 (0.006) 
Pensions and grants 0.422 (0.008) 0.208* (0.007) 
Average monthly measures of 
household income if mother 
employed: 
 
   
Grant income 397.500 (15.076) 227.252* (10.285) 
Total income 3095.888 (116.436) 5777.660* (290.485) 
Per capita income 659.249 (27.336) 1271.397* (66.199) 
Income per adult equivalent 790.888 (35.131) 1512.902* (80.457) 
Average monthly measures of 
household income if mother 
unemployed/economically inactive: 
   
Grant income 733.685 (13.919) 436.502* (12.724) 
Total income 1678.995 (50.302) 2271.492* (65.579) 
Per capita income 273.614 (9.628) 479.459* (15.569) 
Income per adult equivalent 331.235 (11.280) 576.303* (18.598) 
 White 
Main source of income:    
Salaries and wages 0.958 (0.017) 0.946 (0.011) 
Remittances 0.008 (0.007) 0.002 (0.002) 
Pensions and grants 0.019 (0.011) 0.007 (0.004) 
Average monthly measures of 
household income if mother 
employed: 
 
   
Grant income 60.627 (35.509) 15.658 (5.364) 
Total income 11348.540 (1695.910) 17699.290* (937.721) 
Per capita income 3863.561 (874.047) 4597.068 (243.750) 
Income per adult equivalent 4155.614 (864.656) 5435.148 (303.589) 
Average monthly measures of 
household income if mother 
unemployed/economically inactive: 
   
Grant income 232.805 (123.942) 52.010 (14.307) 
Total income 4642.884 (1082.569) 14137.770* (2532.801) 
Per capita income 999.508 (279.332) 3399.547* (572.460) 
Income per adult equivalent 1214.073 (377.977) 4190.778* (797.134) 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design.  Estimates only include co-resident mothers for whom race and marital status 
information is non-missing.  The broad unemployment rate includes both the searching and the non-
searching unemployed. 
* indicates a significant difference in means and proportions across single co-resident mothers and married 
co-resident mothers using a 95 percent confidence interval.  
                                                 
16 Three other sources of income: ‘Selling farm products’, ‘Other non-farm income’ and ‘No income’ are 
very small percentages hence are excluded from the table.  
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To further explore differences in the economic status of single and married mothers, I 
plot the kernel density of total and per capita household monthly income for co-resident 
mothers by their marital status.  Income in South Africa is very unequally distributed 
(Van der Berg et al. 2009), thus a comparison of average income does not reveal the true 
extent of inequality.  The kernel density plots highlight differences in access to resources 
along the distribution of income.   
 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that the total, and per capita, household monthly incomes of 
African single co-resident mothers are concentrated at around 800 Rands and 150 Rands 
respectively.  These same diagrams illustrate the kernel density plots representing the 
incomes of African married co-resident mothers.  These density plots spike at similar 
levels, but the proportion of married mothers receiving these incomes is far below that of 
single mothers.  Beyond total and per capita incomes of about 2,000 Rands and 400 
Rands respectively the kernel density plots representing household incomes of African 
married co-resident mothers lie above those of their single counterparts which illustrates 
that married mothers are far more likely to have greater access to resources. 
 
In Figure 3.3, the kernel density plot which graphs the total household monthly income of 
White single co-resident mothers is at a maximum at about 5,000 Rands which is well 
below the 9,000 Rands at which the plot for White married co-resident mothers is 
approximately at its highest.  Moreover, beyond 13,000 Rands the total income graph for 
married mothers lies above that of single mothers which shows that married mothers’ 
households have far greater access to resources.  A similar pattern is shown for per capita 
household monthly income in Figure 3.4 with the resources of single and married 
mothers being concentrated at around 1,000 and 2,000 Rands respectively.  A comparison 
across graphs illustrates that African co-resident mothers are substantially worse off than 
White co-resident mothers.  Furthermore, of the four groups of mothers, White married 
co-resident mothers are the most economically advantaged as they have far greater access 




Figure 3.1 Kernel density plot of total household monthly income of co-resident 
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Figure 3.2 Kernel density plot of per capita household monthly income of co-
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Figure 3.3 Kernel density plot of total household monthly income of co-resident 
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Figure 3.4 Kernel density plot of per capita household monthly income of co-
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With the information in Tables 3.4 and 3.6, it is possible to calculate the extent to which a 
mother’s salary supports her household.  In African households, on average, the 
individual income of an employed single co-resident mother is 1,861 Rands and the 
income/expenditure of her household is 3,096 Rands.  According to these figures, the 
household is supported 60 per cent by the mother’s salary, 13 per cent by grant income 
(average grant income is 398 Rands) and 27 per cent by some other source of funding.  
The average earnings of an African married co-resident mother are 2,498 Rands which 
makes up a far lower 43 per cent of her household’s total income of 5,778 Rands.   
 
In White households, on average, the individual income of an employed single co-
resident mother is 8,771 Rands and her household’s income/expenditure is 11,349 Rands.  
According to these figures, the household is supported 77 per cent by the mother’s salary 
and 23 per cent by another source of funding.  In contrast to single African mothers, the 
support from grant income is small at less than one per cent. A White married co-resident 
mother, on average, earns 8,035 Rands which comprises 45 per cent of her household’s 
total income of 17,699 Rands.  This proportion is very similar to that of African married 
co-resident mothers. 
 
The “other” source of financial support that is likely to fund African and White single co-
resident mothers households by up to 27 per cent and 23 per cent respectively is private 
maintenance from the father of the child.  It is important to remember that the GHS 2006 
does not capture private maintenance receipts.  To overcome this problem, I adjusted 
household income using expenditure data.  This will not give an exact figure for private 
maintenance but it can give an indication of the extent to which fathers contribute 
towards their children’s economic wellbeing. 
 
Table 3.7 shows the average number of grants received by households and confirms that 
African households are more dependent on grant income than White households.  
Moreover, the households in which African single co-resident mothers live, on average, 
receive significantly more state pension payments, Child Support Grants and disability 
grants than the households in which African married co-resident mothers reside.  This 
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would suggest that single African mothers are far more reliant on public sector assistance 
for their economic wellbeing.  White co-resident mothers, on average, receive very few 
grants and the differences in mean proportions are not significant by marital status. 
 
Table 3.7: Average number of grants received in co-resident mothers’ households, 
by marital status of the mother, 2006 
 Single Married 
 African 
Type of Grant    
Pension 0.280 (0.008) 0.117* (0.006) 
Child support 1.478 (0.024) 1.023* (0.021) 
Disability 0.140 (0.007) 0.094* (0.006) 
Care dependency 0.009 (0.002) 0.009 (0.003) 
Foster care 0.023 (0.003) 0.013 (0.003) 
 White 
Type of Grant    
Pension 0.081 (0.038) 0.027 (0.008) 
Child support 0.027 (0.018) 0.010 (0.004) 
Disability 0.014 (0.009) 0.013 (0.004) 
Care dependency 0.003 (0.003) 0.000 (0.000) 
Foster care 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design.  Estimates only include co-resident mothers for whom race and marital status 
information is non-missing.   
* indicates a significant difference in means across single co-resident mothers and married co-resident 
mothers using a 95 percent confidence interval.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have explained that the primary reason for using the GHS 2006 is that it 
includes data on grant receipts and this information is required when analysing the 
economic status of South African mothers.  Public transfers, especially Child Support 
Grants, would be expected to contribute towards the welfare of mothers and their 
children, in particular, in single-mother families.  I have also clarified that the limitation 
of using this dataset is that it is only possible to identify a sample of mothers who are co-
resident with their children.  The GHS 2006 does not contain a birth module hence it is 
only possible to identify mothers via household relationship questions which imposes a 
co-residency requirement on motherhood.  I noted that the restriction on co-resident 
mothers is likely to underestimate the economic wellbeing of all mothers, principally 
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African single mothers, because many African single mothers are migrant labourers who 
have left their children in their household of origin to search for better work 
opportunities. 
 
Despite this restriction, I have used data from the GHS 2006 to gain valuable insights into 
the welfare of co-resident mothers by marital status.  I have shown that African and 
White single co-resident mothers are more likely to live in households with lower 
monthly incomes than their married counterparts.  This can be largely explained by the 
fact that single co-resident mothers are likely to live with fewer employed men, thus they 
have less access to the income of an employed male.  Moreover, I have calculated that 
when a single co-resident mother is employed, her household is very dependent on her 
income.  In contrast to this, a married co-resident mother’s earnings make up less than 50 
per cent of her household’s total income.  Furthermore, African single co-resident 
mothers are more likely to depend on social grants, in particular state pensions and Child 
Support Grants for their economic wellbeing.  As discussed in Chapter Two, a household 
with greater reliance on the earnings of a female and on grant income is expected to be 
worse off than a household that is supported by an employed man.  In Chapter Three I 
have shown that married co-resident mothers, who are more likely to benefit from the 
income of a male partner, are indeed, on average, better off than their single counterparts.  
 
In line with expectations, economic wellbeing differed along racial lines with White 
mothers, on average, being better off than African mothers.  Using kernel density plots I 
was able to show that inequalities exist not only with regard to mean proportions but 
along the distribution of income as well. Moreover, inequitable income distributions were 
evident within both racial groups when comparing co-resident mothers by marital status 
with single mothers being concentrated in lower income brackets.   
 
Using the GHS 2006, I have shown that there are many single co-resident mothers in 
South Africa.  Indeed, nearly 3.2 million single mothers of all races were identified as 
living with their children.  If not co-resident mothers were also included, the incidence of 
single motherhood would be higher.  Given that, on average, they have access to fewer 
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resources, single mothers and their children would be expected to be far more susceptible 
to poverty than traditional two-parent families.  To complete the investigation of 
economic status, a poverty analysis would need to be conducted to assess the 
vulnerability of single mothers and to identify which income sources are most successful 
in alleviating their situation. 
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Chapter Four 





Poverty levels in South Africa have been widely researched.  Apartheid-era policies 
resulted in a very unequal allocation of resources with Whites being the primary 
beneficiaries of these laws and Africans being left considerably worse off (Seekings 
2007).  Given South Africa’s racially segregated history, many poverty studies have 
focused on the racial distribution of resources (see for example Van der Berg et al. 2009; 
Van der Berg et al. 2007; Hoogeveen and Özler 2006).  Other studies have explored the 
gendered access to resources (see for example Armstrong and Burger 2009; Posel and 
Rogan 2009a; Posel and Rogan 2009b; Bhorat and van der Westhuizen 2008; Budlender 
2005).  There has, however, been little work on poverty incidence among mothers, and in 
particular, on how the extent and depth of poverty varies by the marital status of mothers.   
 
In this chapter I investigate poverty levels of African and White co-resident mothers by 
marital status.  I calculate several poverty indices and I use a decomposition technique to 
determine the contribution made by various categories of income to poverty reduction.  I 
also explore more qualitative measures of poverty by analysing various lifestyle 
indicators to gain an understanding of the quality of life experienced by single co-resident 
mothers compared to married co-resident mothers.   
 
In section 4.2 I report the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) measures of poverty for single 
and married co-resident mothers and I graph the Cumulative Distribution Functions 
(CDFs) of per capita household monthly income of co-resident mothers by their marital 
status.  I then investigate the contribution that various income sources make to poverty 
alleviation in section 4.3.  This is achieved by decomposing the FGT measures of poverty 
using the Shapley-value.  In section 4.4 I analyse various indicators of wellbeing.  The 
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areas that I explore are co-resident mothers’ health status, their community welfare and 
their asset ownership.  Section 4.5 concludes the chapter by providing a brief summary of 
the key findings.  
 
4.2 Poverty estimates for single and married co-resident mothers 
 
The first objective in conducting a poverty analysis is determining an appropriate 
measure of poverty.  Traditionally, poverty has been measured using household data 
(Budlender 2005).  Per capita (or per adult equivalent) income is measured by dividing 
total household income by the number of household occupants (or by a weighted number 
of occupants).  An individual is then considered poor if this calculated measure falls 
below an individual (or adult) poverty line.  A problem with this method is that it 
assumes that resources are distributed fairly and equally among household members, 
which is not always true (Lemke et al. 2003).  If there is an unequal resource distribution 
with, for example a male household-head retaining more income for his own use, leaving 
a female occupant relatively disadvantaged, this measure of poverty will underestimate 
individual poverty levels (Posel and Rogan 2009a).  
 
The availability of individual-level data would address this issue; however, the extra 
costs of gathering this information are likely to outweigh the benefits (Morduch 2005).  
Moreover, it is often impossible to apportion the various flows of income among 
household residents accurately.  Consequently, individual-level data that correctly reflect 
intra-household resource allocation are seldom available and hence this inequality is 
often not accounted for in a poverty analysis (Ferreira and Ravaillon 2008; Gibson 2005).  
Given the difficulties associated with accounting for disparities in intra-household 
resource allocations, I do not adjust for this in the analysis.  However, I augment the 
measures of average poverty incidence by exploring various quality of life indicators in 
section 4.4. 
 
A criticism of using a poverty line is that it is an unrealistic measure as, at the point 
where the line is positioned, one monetary unit separates a poor household from a non-
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poor household (Woolard and Leibbrandt 1999).  It is improbable that one monetary unit 
will lift a poor household out of poverty.  Furthermore, conventionally a poverty line is 
developed by determining what constitutes the basic necessities of a household.  The cost 
of all these items is added up and the poverty line is positioned at this total cost.  A 
problem of subjectivity arises as one individual’s needs may be very different from 
another’s.  In terms of basic food requirements, for example, one person may require 
fewer kilojoules daily in order to survive compared to somebody else (Morduch 2005; 
Woolard and Leibbrandt 1999).   Deciding on a poverty line is therefore a normative 
issue and will depend on value judgments regarding what comprises basic needs, and 
what does not. 
  
Despite these limitations, measuring poverty with a poverty line can be used to gain 
valuable insights into whether co-resident mothers and individuals in their households are 
maintaining a basic standard of living or not.  Hoogeveen and Özler (2006) use the ‘cost-
of-basic-needs’ approach to construct a normative poverty line.  Using 2000 prices, they 
calculate a lower-bound poverty line of 322 Rands per capita per month.  Following their 
approach but using 2006 prices I use a poverty line of 431 Rands per capita per month 
which factors in an inflation rate of 34 per cent from 2000 to 2006 (Statistics South 
Africa 2008).  A co-resident mother is then classified as poor if she lives in a household 
where average per capita monthly household income is below this line.  The advantage of 
using this approach is that this poverty line has been used in previous research in South 
Africa and therefore results can be broadly compared with other studies that have looked 
at gendered access to resources, and overall poverty levels (see for example Posel and 
Rogan 2009a; Posel and Rogan 2009b; Bhorat and van der Westhuizen 2008; Hoogeveen 
and Özler 2006). 
 
Using the poverty line of 431 Rands, I report the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) 
measures of the headcount rate, the poverty gap ratio and the poverty gap ratio squared.  





 For α ≥ 0 
where 
 
z is the poverty line 
yi is the standard of living indicator (for example income or expenditure measure) of the 
ith household 
q represents the population that falls below the poverty line 
n is the total population 
α is the “aversion to poverty” parameter (as α approaches infinity it reflects the poverty 
of only the poorest individual)  
 
The headcount rate (P0) calculates how many individuals are below the poverty line.  It 
measures the proportion of the population that is poor and is obtained by setting α=0.  A 
problem with the headcount index is that it violates the monotonicity axiom thus if the 
income of a person below the poverty line were reduced, this would not be reflected as an 
increase in this measure of poverty (Sen 1976).  Consequently, P0 does not give an 
accurate indication of the depth of poverty as it weights individuals very close to the 
poverty line the same as those individuals very far from the poverty line (Angeriz and 
Chakravarty 2008; Morduch 2005).  A further limitation of the headcount index is that it 
does not satisfy the transfer axiom (Sen 1976).  Thus, if income were transferred from a 
person below the poverty line to someone who is richer, although this would increase the 
severity of poverty within the population, P0 would not increase.   
 
The poverty gap (P1) measures the average distance a poor person is from the poverty 
line and is obtained by setting α=1.  The poverty gap has the advantage over the 
headcount index that it satisfies the monotonicity axiom and therefore provides an 
indication of the depth of poverty amongst the poor.  A problem with the poverty gap 
index is that it does not reflect the inequality among the poor and the measure 
therefore fails the principle of transfers (Angeriz and Chakravarty 2008; Sen 1976).  
 
α











A third FGT poverty index is the poverty gap squared (P2).  This index provides a 















pCV  is the squared coefficient of the variation of income among the poor 
PG is the poverty gap index 
H is the headcount index 
 
This formulation of the poverty gap squared highlights that the measure depends partly 
on the poverty gap and partly on how income is distributed amongst the poor.  The 
measure therefore satisfies the principle of transfers and as such, it is a comprehensive 
index that can be used in drawing comparisons over time, or across different policy 
options (Angeriz and Chakravarty 2008; Woolard and Leibbrandt 1999).  Morduch 
(2005) clarifies that if the poorest individuals experience increased access to resources, 
then this will have the largest impact on the poverty gap squared index.  It is the poorest 
people for whom the poverty gap is greatest; consequently closing this gap will have the 
largest effect on the index when it is squared.  Similarly, if an individual experiences a 
drop in their standard of living from a lower base, then this will have a greater effect on 
P2 than if an individual experiences the same absolute decline, but from a higher base 
(Woolard and Leibbrandt 1999). 
 
Table 4.1 reports the three FGT poverty measures using per capita household monthly 
income of co-resident mothers.  Estimates are calculated by race and by marital status.  
Co-resident mothers are poor if they live in households where the per capita monthly 
income is below the poverty line of 431 Rands (2006 prices).  
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The table shows that within both racial groups, a greater proportion of single co-resident 
mothers live in poor households, compared to their married counterparts.  These 
differences are most pronounced and are statistically significant among Africans.  Of 
African married co-resident mothers, approximately 58 per cent live in poor households, 
compared to just under 78 per cent of African single co-resident mothers who live below 
the poverty line.  The table also highlights South Africa’s unequal resource distribution, 
with White co-resident mothers (whether married or single) being far less likely to be 
poor than African co-resident mothers.   
 
The depth of poverty is reflected in the poverty gap ratio (P1) as it measures the average 
distance a poor person is from the poverty line.  As with the headcount rate, the poverty 
gap is far larger for Africans than for Whites.  It is also greater for single co-resident 
mothers than for married co-resident mothers.  The poverty gap ratio for African single 
co-resident mothers is just over 0.43 compared to the significantly smaller ratio of about 
0.30 for their married counterparts.  The poverty gap for White single co-resident 
mothers is also slightly larger than the ratio for White married co-resident mothers, 
although the difference is not statistically significant.17 
 
The poverty gap squared (P2) gives an indication of the severity of poverty.  This measure 
incorporates the distance of the poor from the poverty line, as well as the degree of 
inequality amongst the poor.  Results are in line with those for the headcount rate (P0) 
and poverty gap ratio (P1).  For Africans and Whites, poverty is more severe for single 
co-resident mothers than for married co-resident mothers.  Furthermore, ratios are far 
larger for Africans than for Whites.  For African single co-resident mothers, the poverty 
gap squared is about 0.28, compared to approximately 0.19 for African married co-
resident mothers.  The poverty gap squared for White married co-resident mothers is 
approximately 0.04, with the ratio being very slightly higher for White single co–resident 
mothers. 
 
                                                 
17 The sample of White mothers is substantially smaller than the sample of African mothers, and the 
standard errors are therefore far larger for poverty estimates among White mothers. This helps account for 
why differences among White mothers are not statistically significant 
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Table 4.1: Poverty estimates for co-resident mothers by marital status, 2006 
 Single Married 
 African 
Per capita household monthly  
income: 
    
Headcount (P0) 0.777 (0.007) 0.582* (0.009) 
Poverty gap (P1) 0.431 (0.005) 0.302* (0.006) 
Poverty gap squared (P2) 0.282 (0.004) 0.192* (0.004) 
 White 
Per capita household monthly 
income: 
    
Headcount (P0) 0.092 (0.043) 0.053 (0.011) 
Poverty gap (P1) 0.051 (0.031) 0.038 (0.008) 
Poverty gap squared (P2) 0.039 (0.029) 0.037 (0.008) 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design. Estimates only include co-resident mothers for whom race and marital status information 
is non-missing. 
* indicates a significant difference in proportions across single co-resident mothers and married co-resident 
mothers using a 95 percent confidence interval.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that the sample of mothers has been restricted to those who 
are co-resident with their children.  Poverty levels of certain groups of mothers may 
therefore be over-estimated.  As discussed in the previous chapter, mothers who are not 
residing with their children, in particular mothers who have migrated to other areas in 
order to find work, are excluded from the sample.  This may result in the income levels of 
mothers, especially African single mothers, being underestimated.  This, in turn, may 
lead to poverty measures of primarily African single mothers being over-estimated. 
 
To further investigate the extent of poverty, I plot Cumulative Distribution Functions 
(CDFs) of per capita household monthly income for African and White co-resident 
mothers by marital status.18  For every level of per capita income shown on the horizontal 
axis, the CDF indicates the proportion of co-resident mothers who are likely to be living 
in households earning that level of per capita monthly income or less. The CDF therefore 
illustrates the probability of co-resident mothers living on or below the poverty line.   
                                                 
18 The samples of White and African co-resident mothers are restricted to those with per capita household 
monthly incomes equal to or less than 7,000 Rands or 3,000 Rands respectively. As a result of these 
restrictions, the poverty rates reflected in the Cumulative Distribution Functions will be higher than those 
measured for the full samples of all African and White co-resident mothers. 
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The CDF for African single co-resident mothers lies above, and therefore first order 
dominates the CDF for African married co-resident mothers for all levels of per capita 
household monthly income up to 3,000 Rands.  The gap between the two groups of 
mothers is greatest for per capita income levels around the poverty line.  At higher 
income levels, beyond approximately 1,500 Rands, the gap begins to narrow.  African 
single co-resident mothers are therefore far more likely to live in households with lower 
per capita monthly incomes than their married counterparts.  They are also more likely to 
live in households with per capita monthly incomes equal to or below the poverty line. 
 
The CDF for White single co-resident mothers first order dominates the CDF for White 
married co-resident mothers for income levels from approximately 300 Rands up to 7,000 
Rands. Like Africans, White single co-resident mothers are more likely to live on or 
below the poverty line than White married co-resident mothers.  Moreover, White single 
co-resident mothers, on average, live in households with lower per capita monthly 
incomes compared to their married counterparts. 
 
Figure 4.1 Cumulative Distribution Functions by marital status of co-resident 
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Source: GHS 2006 
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Figure 4.2 Cumulative Distribution Functions by marital status of co-resident  
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4.3 Decomposing poverty among single and married co-resident mothers 
 
To explore the contribution made by various sources of income to poverty alleviation, I 
decompose the FGT poverty measures using the Shapley-value (Araar and Duclos 2009; 
Duclos and Araar 2006; Shorrocks 1982).  The Shapley-value measures the extent to 
which the various sources of income contribute towards poverty reduction.  I evaluate the 
impact of three categories of resources: earned income; grant income and “other income”.  
The latter category measures the difference between total household expenditure and total 
household income (where expenditure is greater than reported income) as explained in 
section 3.2.  The poverty decomposition computes the degree to which the three income 
sources reduce the headcount ratio, the poverty gap ratio and the poverty gap squared 
ratio.  In effect, it separates the total reduction of poverty (as measured by the FGT 
indices) into the sum of the contributions made by the various income categories (Araar 
and Duclos 2009).  The advantage of the Shapley-value is that it calculates the average 
marginal effect of a component of income on poverty alleviation over all possible 
Source: GHS 2006 
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distributions of income sources across individuals (Armstrong and Burger 2009; Posel 
and Rogan 2009b).  It therefore overcomes the problem of having to specify the order in 
which the various types of income enter the model as the average marginal effect is 
calculated for all possible distributions of income categories. 
 
A primary objective of this section is to assess whether social grants have been effective 
in reducing poverty among co-resident mothers, in particular single mothers and their 
children.  As noted in Chapter Two, mothers and their children are the primary recipients 
of the CSG, and the income decomposition assists in evaluating the effectiveness of this, 
and other transfer programmes.  For African co-resident mothers, the greatest 
contribution of grant income is in reducing the severity and depth of poverty.  The 
poverty gap squared ratio for single and married mothers is reduced by about 43 and 24 
per cent respectively and the poverty gap ratio by about 38 and 19 per cent respectively.   
Consequently social grants play a significant role in improving the economic wellbeing 
of African single co-resident mothers, in particular.   Earned income still has the greatest 
marginal effect on the headcount rate and also plays a major role in reducing the depth 
and severity of poverty.  The marginal effect of earnings on the poverty gap and poverty 
gap squared ratios, however, is greater for African married co-resident mothers, which 
indicates that earned income plays a much larger role than grant income in improving the 
welfare of this group of mothers. 
 
Social grants play a relatively minor role in improving the economic status of White co-
resident mothers.  The income source that plays the most significant role in reducing the 
incidence, depth and severity of poverty for single and married mothers is earnings.  For 
P0, P1 and P2, earned income decreases the measure by at least 75 per cent.  “Other 
income” also improves the economic status of White co-resident mothers with the 
marginal effect being slightly higher for White single co-resident mothers.  This would 
suggest that there is an income source, not specifically accounted for by the GHS 2006 
that plays a role in poverty alleviation.  This income may be private maintenance, 
unemployment benefits, work pensions or gratuities; however from the available 
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information it is not possible to tell which is having the greatest effect on poverty 
reduction.  
 
The contribution of maintenance payments towards poverty alleviation is a key factor 
when analysing the welfare of single-mother families.  Given that the GHS 2006 does not 
include information on maintenance receipts, the contribution of this resource towards 
poverty relief among single co-resident mothers can only be approximated by analysing 
the effect of “other income”.  Among White single co-resident mothers, “other income” 
decreases each of the three poverty measures by about 20 per cent.   The effect of “other 
income” on the welfare of African single co-resident mothers is much smaller as it 
reduces the incidence, depth and severity of poverty by no more than 13 per cent.   
 
Chapter Three highlighted that, on average, maintenance receipts would constitute a 
relatively small proportion of an employed single co-resident mother’s total household 
monthly income.  The earnings of an African single co-resident mother, on average, 
account for approximately 60 per cent of her household’s total resources whilst the salary 
of a White single co-resident mother, on average, accounts for about 77 per cent of her 
household’s total income.  Indeed, after accounting for grant income, maintenance 
receipts, on average, would at most constitute 27 and 23 per cent of the total monthly 
income of the households in which employed African and White single co-resident 
mothers live, respectively.  These results suggest that, on average, an employed single co-
resident mother bears the financial burden of childrearing with relatively little financial 
support from the father of her child.  Thus, greater financial assistance from non-resident 
fathers could potentially make a larger contribution towards poverty alleviation among 
single-mother families.  It is important to note however that the contribution of 
maintenance towards the total household monthly income of single co-resident mothers, 
and towards poverty relief among single co-resident mothers may be underestimated as a 
result of direct information on maintenance amounts not being available.   
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Table 4.2: Relative contribution of income sources to poverty alleviation for co-
resident mothers, 2006 
 Single Married 
 African 
 Headcount ratio (α=0) 
Earned income 0.820 0.897 
Grant income 0.122 0.052 
Other income 0.058 0.051 
Total 1.000 1.000 
 Poverty gap ratio (α=1) 
Earned income 0.505 0.705 
Grant income 0.380 0.191 
Other income 0.115 0.104 
Total 1.000 1.000 
 Poverty gap squared ratio (α=2) 
Earned income 0.441 0.641 
Grant income 0.431 0.239 
Other income 0.127 0.120 
Total 1.000 1.000 
 White 
 Headcount ratio (α=0) 
Earned income 0.788 0.830 
Grant income 0.009 0.000 
Other income 0.203 0.170 
Total 1.000 1.000 
 Poverty gap ratio (α=1) 
Earned income 0.762 0.816 
Grant income 0.032 0.006 
Other income 0.206 0.178 
Total 1.000 1.000 
 Poverty gap squared ratio (α=2) 
Earned income 0.753 0.811 
Grant income 0.040 0.010 
Other income 0.206 0.180 
Total 1.000 1.000 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in the survey design. Estimates only 
include co-resident mothers for whom race and marital status information is non-missing.  Proportions may 
not add up to 1.000 because of rounding. 
 
4.4 Lifestyle indicators for single and married co-resident mothers 
 
Measuring poverty using income and expenditure data provides a useful indication of the 
extent of poverty.  However, poverty is a multi-faceted phenomenon that cannot be 
represented solely by quantitative measures.  A more qualitative analysis should be 
included in a poverty study in order to gain an understanding of how poverty manifests 
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itself and affects individuals’ quality of life (Higgs 2007).  Moreover, the poverty line 
used in section 4.2 above, represents the cost of basic needs (Hoogeveen and Özler 
2006).  It therefore does not reflect individual perceptions of what is considered a 
desirable standard of living.  Consequently, the poverty line cannot be used to show how 
many individuals have achieved their desired lifestyle, and how many have not.  To 
compare the socio-economic status of co-resident mothers by their marital status 
effectively, it is therefore important to explore variables that reflect differences in living 
standards.  
 
Tables 4.3 to 4.5 compare various lifestyle indicators for co-resident mothers by their 
marital status.  Three broad categories of lifestyle indicators are investigated, namely 
physical and mental health status, community welfare and ownership of household assets.  
Within each category, several variables are compared to gain an overview of co-resident 
mothers’ standards of living.   
 
Table 4.3 shows that on average African and White single co-resident mothers do not 
report major differences in their general health levels compared to their married 
counterparts.  White single co-resident mothers are slightly more likely to have had an 
illness or injury in the month preceding the survey, compared to White married co-
resident mothers.  African single co-resident mothers are marginally less likely to be ill or 
injured compared to African married co-resident mothers.  These results are somewhat 
surprising as significantly higher levels of physical and mental ill-health may be expected 
among single co-resident mothers as they have less access to resources.  Their lower 
income levels would suggest that they are less able to afford high quality health care.  
These results also conflict with Philo et al. (2009) who report on a comprehensive study 
of families with children in Britain.  Philo et al. (2009) note that single mothers are far 
more likely to report suffering from ill-health compared to their married counterparts. 
 
A possible reason why single co-resident mothers in South Africa do not report higher 
levels of ill-health than their married counterparts can be found in Nussbaum’s (1997) 
review of “adaptive preferences”.  Nussbaum (1997) cites Sen’s (1985) comparison of 
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the health status of widows and widowers in Singur, India in 1944 – a year after the 
Bengal Famine of 1943.  Despite it being well-known that widows suffered from 
significantly poorer levels of health, they reported better states of health than widowers.  
Nussbaum (1997: 282) notes that: 
 
“The likely explanation for this discrepancy is that people who have regularly been 
malnourished, who have in addition been told that they are weak and made for 
suffering, and who, as widows, are told that they are virtually dead and have no 
rights, will be unlikely to recognize their fatigue and low energy as a sign of bodily 
disease; but not so for males, who are brought up to have high expectations for their 
own physical functioning”. 
  
Poorer individuals are also likely to be less health aware and may not report an illness or 
injury despite being observably in an adverse state of health (Woolard and Leibbrandt 
1999).  Thus, single co-resident mothers, on average, may not have as much knowledge 
on health related issues as married co-resident mothers, and they may have become 
accustomed to their relatively poorer states of health.  For these reasons, they may not be 
reporting illnesses or injuries even though they may actually be suffering from them. 
 
Certain sicknesses are strongly related to poverty, such as tuberculosis (TB), diarrhea and 
fever (Dong et al. 2007; Abu Mourad 2004; Woolard and Leibbrandt 1999).  To ascertain 
whether co-resident mothers are reporting illnesses associated with poverty, I have 
compared the incidence of flu, TB and diarrhea amongst these mothers.19  African single 
co-resident mothers are more likely to suffer from TB and diarrhea (although they are 
slightly less likely to suffer from flu than their married counterparts).  White single co-
resident mothers are more likely to suffer from diarrhea and flu than White married co-
resident mothers.  The incidence of TB among both groups of White co-resident mothers 
is zero.   
 
                                                 
19 A comparison of the incidence all illnesses and injuries for single and married co-resident mothers is 
included in Appendix 4A 
 81
Differences in overall health status (in the month preceding the survey) therefore are very 
small between married and single mothers. However, there are larger differences in 
specific illnesses. In particular, single co-resident mothers are more likely than married 
mothers to report having had diarrhea in the last month, TB (among African mothers) and 
flu (among white mothers). To explore the health status of co-resident mothers even 
further, I analyse other variables related to quality of life which would be expected to 
impact negatively on their states of health.  
 
One such variable would be an individual’s exposure to violent crime.  Levels of violence 
in South Africa are much higher than global averages; in particular the rate of homicide 
where women are the victims of intimate partner violence is six times the worldwide 
average (Seedat et al. 2009).  The GHS 2006 asks respondents whether any household 
residents have been victims of violence or abuse (see Appendix 4B for questions).  The 
identities of the victims are not revealed, but violent crime would be expected to impact 
negatively on a co-resident mother’s psychological health irrespective of whether she is 
the direct victim or whether she experiences violence indirectly when a crime is 
committed against a household member.  
 
In cases where the perpetrator is a household resident, African single co-resident mothers, 
on average, experience similar levels of violence in their households as African married 
co-resident mothers.  Where the perpetrator is a non-resident, African single co-resident 
mothers, on average, experience slightly higher levels of violence in their households 
than their married counterparts. 
 
White single co-resident mothers, on average, are exposed to similar levels of violence 
when the perpetrator is a household resident, as their married counterparts.  Differences 
are more pronounced, however, when violence is committed by an individual who is not 
a household member.  More than 17 per cent of White single co-resident mothers live in 
households where some form of violence was experienced among household members, 
compared to less than four per cent of White married co-resident mothers.  Due to this 
significantly greater exposure to violence, White single co-resident mothers would be 
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expected to suffer from higher levels of general ill-health compared to their married 
counterparts. 
 
Somewhat surprising is that the levels of reported violence are considerably higher in 
households in which White single co-resident mothers live compared to African single 
co-resident mothers.  African women are exposed to high levels of violence, for example, 
they have a much higher risk of rape than other racial groups (Seedat et al. 2009).  Their 
reason for reporting lower levels of violence is not clear, but it may be influenced by 
different perceptions of what constitutes violence.  Moreover, a victim may have become 
accustomed to abuse and therefore does not recognize it as a crime.  Another reason may 
be that a victim may be unwilling to report on this (particularly if the perpetrator is a 
partner or ex-partner).  A respondent may not trust that the surveys are anonymous and 
confidential and may be fearful of the consequences of her abuser finding out if she 
admits to being a victim of the crime.  As noted by Smyth and Artz (2005), a victim may 
be financially dependent on her abuser and cannot afford to lose that financial support.  
Furthermore instances of violence against particular household members may be 
unknown to the household’s main respondent (especially in the case of sexual 
molestation).  The victim may not be the household’s principal respondent therefore the 
crime may not be reported.  Moreover if the perpetrator of violence is the respondent then 
they are unlikely to report their acts of violence against other household members. 
 
The above discussion highlights that data on violence and abuse should be used with 
caution.  This is particularly relevant in the case of domestic violence which is 
notoriously under-reported and in many cases victims do not even seek treatment (Waters 
et al. 2004).  Despite these potential problems, it is still useful to analyse the information 
gathered in the GHS 2006 to gain preliminary insights into which groups of co-resident 
mothers are more likely to experience some type of abuse, and consequently would be 
more likely to suffer from health problems and inferior quality of life.  
 
A co-resident mother’s experience of hunger would give an indication of her experience 
of extreme poverty.  Just under 75 per cent of African single co-resident mothers’ 
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households reported that adults and children never went hungry in the past year.  African 
married co-resident mothers’ households reported a significantly higher figure of nearly 
82 per cent.  Households in which White co-resident mothers live are far less likely to 
experience child or adult hunger. However, households with single mothers are more at 
risk of going hungry than their married counterparts.  
 
Children in White households appear to face greater food insecurity than adults.  This is 
consistent with previous research that has found that food insecurity for children can be 
greater than for co-resident adults (Lemke et al. 2003).  Lemke et al. (2003) find that 
power relations within a household are significant in determining the level of food 
insecurity and that the risk is greatest for children in man-led households, compared to 
children in partnership and woman-led households.  As shown in Table 3.5, White co-
resident mothers are less likely to live in female-headed households compared to African 
co-resident mothers, which may partly explain why children in White co-resident mothers 
households are more likely to go hungry than adults.  
 
Of further interest, is whether co-resident mothers use health care facilities in the public 
or private sector.  Van der Berg (2006) notes that public health care is generally regarded 
as an inferior good, thus as incomes rise, individuals prefer to make use of health care 
services in the private sector.  The high cost of health care would make private sector 
services unattainable for individuals without the necessary resources.  However, Van der 
Berg (2006) notes that despite their substantially lower incomes, even some poor 
individuals make use of private health care services as they perceive these to be of much 
better quality than public sector services.   
 
As would be expected, single co-resident mothers within both racial groups are 
significantly less likely to be covered by a medical aid, and are more likely to use public 
medical facilities than their married counterparts.  This would suggest that, on average, 
married co-resident mothers are more likely to be able to enjoy a standard of living that 
includes private health care than single co-resident mothers.  Single co-resident mothers 
are more likely to use public medical facilities as their lower incomes would prevent 
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them from accessing services in the private sector.  Moreover, racial disparities can again 
be noted with White co-resident mothers (whether married or single) being more likely to 
use health care services in the private sector, and being more likely to be covered by a 





























Table 4.3: Physical and mental health status of co-resident mothers, 2006 
 Single Married 
 African 
Mother has been ill/injured in past month 0.150 (0.006) 0.151 (0.006) 
Mother had TB or severe cough with blood 0.074 (0.010) 0.043 (0.009) 
Mother had diarrhea 0.043 (0.007) 0.040 (0.008) 
Mother had flu or upper respiratory tract 
infection 0.513 (0.022) 0.522 (0.021) 
Household member has been a victim of 
violence perpetrated by another household 
member20 
0.020 (0.002) 0.020 (0.002) 
Household member has been a victim of 
violence perpetrated by a person outside 
the household 
0.055 (0.004) 0.042 (0.004) 
Adults never went hungry in past year 0.744 (0.007) 0.818* (0.007) 
Children never went hungry in past year 0.749 (0.007) 0.819* (0.007) 
Mother is covered by a medical 
aid/medical benefit scheme 0.048 (0.004) 0.126* (0.006) 
Household members use public medical 
facilities21 0.903 (0.005) 0.815* (0.007) 
 White 
Mother has been ill/injured in past month 0.146 (0.051) 0.129 (0.022) 
Mother had TB or severe cough with blood 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Mother had diarrhea 0.102 (0.099) 0.038 (0.025) 
Mother had flu or upper respiratory tract 
infection 1.000 (0.000) 0.622 (0.098) 
Household member has been a victim of 
violence perpetrated by another household 
member 
0.011 (0.011) 0.009 (0.004) 
Household member has been a victim of 
violence perpetrated by a person outside 
the household 
0.171 (0.057) 0.035* (0.009) 
Adults never went hungry in past year 0.933 (0.032) 0.977 (0.009) 
Children never went hungry in past year 0.862 (0.048) 0.930 (0.014) 
Mother is covered by a medical 
aid/medical benefit scheme 0.413 (0.069) 0.672* (0.026) 
Household members use public medical 
facilities 0.243 (0.062) 0.141 (0.018) 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design.  Estimates only include co-resident mothers for whom race and marital status 
information is non-missing. 
* indicates a significant difference in proportions across single co-resident mothers and married co-resident 
mothers using a 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
                                                 
20 Acts of violence include being harassed, threatened, sexually molested, beaten up, hurt and murdered. 
21 Public medical facilities include a public hospital, a public clinic and ‘other’ in the public sector. 
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Access to basic services, such as electricity, clean water and sanitation positively impacts 
on an individual’s health and quality of life.  Not only does this access allow individuals 
to live in more sanitised environments but it allows them – in particular women - to save 
time as they do not need to collect water or wood (Klasen 1997).  As with income 
inequality, studies that have explored unequal access to services and infrastructure have 
tended to do so along racial lines (see for example Leibbrandt et al. 2006; Van der Berg 
2006).  There does not appear to be much focus on the gendered access to services in 
South Africa which implies that little, if any, attention has been paid to comparing the 
access to basic services of single mothers relative to married mothers. 
 
Table 4.4 shows that access to basic services is not that different when comparing single 
and married co-resident mothers within each racial group.  The differences are greatest 
when comparing African co-resident mothers to their White counterparts.  African co-
resident mothers are far less likely to have access to piped water, to be connected to 
MAINS electricity and to have a toilet inside their dwelling than White co-resident 
mothers.  Indeed, nearly all the households in which White co-resident mothers live have 
access to these basic services, regardless of the mother’s marital status. 
 
These disparities between the two racial groups are largely a consequence of apartheid-
era policies which resulted in the White population having greater access to municipal 
services.  When apartheid ended in 1994, the White population had universal access to 
piped water, whereas only a quarter of Africans had piped water in their homes 
(Hoogeveen and Özler 2006).  Using data from the 1996 Census, Leibbrandt et al. (2006) 
show that Africans were far less likely to have access to electricity, piped water and flush 
toilets than all other population groups.   
 
Since 1994, the government has made progress in targeting expenditure to assist the 
poorer sectors of the population which are comprised principally of Africans (Hoogeveen 
and Özler 2006; Van der Berg 2006).  This may be a reason why, according to the GHS 
2006, 67 to 69 per cent of African co-resident mothers live in households that have access 
to piped water, compared to 25 per cent of Africans in general having piped water circa 
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1994, as observed by Hoogeveen and Özler (2006).  Nonetheless, persistent differences 
in access to services continue to be observed in 2006, when comparing the households in 
which White and African mothers reside, differences which suggest that more work 
needs to be done in reducing racial inequalities in access to basic services.  
 
African co-resident mothers are also far more likely to live in communities with 
environmental problems than their white counterparts.  Just over 57 per cent of African 
single co-resident mothers and nearly 56 per cent of African married co-resident mothers 
live in households that report environmental concerns.  White married co-resident 
mothers are least likely to experience environmental problems with just under 26 percent 
reporting these issues.  White single co-resident mothers are more likely to experience 
environmental troubles than their married counterparts with nearly 36 per cent living in 
households that have been exposed to these types of hazards.  
 
Toxic environments are likely to have a negative effect on quality of life.  Thus, White 
married co-resident mothers, on average, are more likely to enjoy higher living standards 
as they are least likely to be exposed to environmental hazards and toxins.  In this regard, 
White single co-resident mothers, on average, are worse off than their married 














Table 4.4: Welfare of communities in which co-resident mothers reside, 2006 
 Single Married 
 African 
Household has access to piped water 0.672 (0.007) 0.692 (0.008) 
Household is connected to MAINS 
electricity supply 0.775 (0.007) 0.759 (0.008) 
Household has toilet inside dwelling 0.196 (0.007) 0.239* (0.008) 
Community has environmental problem22 0.572 (0.008) 0.556 (0.009) 
 White 
Household has access to piped water 0.978 (0.010) 0.946 (0.008) 
Household is connected to MAINS 
electricity supply 0.972 (0.021) 0.990 (0.005) 
Household has toilet inside dwelling 1.000 (0.000) 0.985 (0.006) 
Community has environmental problem 0.357 (0.071) 0.258 (0.023) 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design.  Estimates only include co-resident mothers for whom race and marital status 
information is non-missing. 
* indicates a significant difference in proportions across single co-resident mothers and married co-resident 
mothers using a 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
As a final indication of the quality of life enjoyed by co-resident mothers, I have 
compared household ownership of assets in Table 4.5.  Among Africans, about seven per 
cent of single co-resident mothers’ households own a car compared to about 17 per cent 
of married co-resident mothers’ households.  African single co-resident mothers are also 
less likely to live in a household that owns a television or books than their married 
counterparts.  Among Whites, just over 76 per cent of single co-resident mothers live in a 
household that owns a car compared to 91 per cent of White married co-resident mothers.  
White single co-resident mothers are slightly less likely to own a television and slightly 
more likely to own books compared to their married counterparts.  Overall, African co-
resident mothers’ households are less likely to own a car, television or books than White 
co-resident mothers’ households.   
 
Given that within both population groups, single co-resident mothers, on average, live in 
households with lower per capita incomes, they would be expected to live in households 
that, on average, own fewer assets.  Items like cars and televisions would generally be 
perceived as luxuries, particularly among poorer individuals (Clark 2003).  As married 
                                                 
22 Environmental problems include littering, water pollution, air pollution, excessive noise and land 
degradation. 
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co-resident mothers are more likely to live in households that own these assets this would 
suggest that, on average, they have access to a better quality of life than their single 
counterparts. 23    
 
Table 4.5: Ownership of assets by co-resident mothers’ households, 2006 
 Single Married 
 African 
Household has a car 0.071 (0.004) 0.172* (0.007) 
Household owns a T.V. 0.626 (0.008) 0.680* (0.008) 
Household owns books 0.524 (0.008) 0.540 (0.009) 
 White 
Household has a car 0.763 (0.065) 0.910 (0.015) 
Household owns a T.V. 0.968 (0.031) 0.991 (0.004) 
Household owns books 0.961 (0.016) 0.934 (0.014) 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design.  Estimates only include co-resident mothers for whom race and marital status 
information is non-missing. 
* indicates a significant difference in proportions across single co-resident mothers and married co-resident 




This chapter has investigated poverty rates and the standards of living of African and 
White co-resident mothers by their marital status.  To quantify the extent and depth of 
poverty among co-resident mothers I calculated the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) 
poverty indices.  All these measures indicated that African co-resident mothers are more 
likely to be living in poverty than White co-resident mothers.  Moreover, within both 
racial groups, single co-resident mothers are more likely to be poor, and to be living in 
more severe poverty, compared to married co-resident mothers.   
 
The decomposition of the FGT indices revealed that earned income made the greatest 
marginal contribution to reducing the poverty rate for both African and White co-resident 
mothers. Grant income played an important role in reducing the depth and severity of 
poverty among African co-resident mothers, particularly single African co-resident 
mothers.  Earnings played a substantial role in improving the economic status of White 
                                                 
23 Differences in asset ownership may also reflect gender differences in consumption spending, assuming 
that male preferences are more apparent in households in which married co-resident mothers reside. 
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co-resident mothers regardless of the poverty measure used.  “Other” income sources also 
contributed to raising the average standard of living of White mothers but to a far lesser 
extent than wages and salaries.  As the GHS 2006 does not have data on private 
maintenance, private pensions, unemployment benefits and other transfers, it is not 
possible to identify which of these sources of “other” income is making the greatest 
contribution to poverty alleviation. 
 
To augment the poverty study and to gain further insights into the standards of living of 
these different groups of mothers, I then examined various quality of life indicators.  I 
explored differences in health status and community welfare as well as differences in 
asset ownership.  Findings from this investigation mirrored the patterns identified in the 
poverty analysis.  Most notably, White co-resident mothers are more likely to enjoy 
higher standards of living than African co-resident mothers.  Furthermore, for both 
Africans and Whites, married co-resident mothers, on average, appear to enjoy a better 
quality of life than single co-resident mothers. 
 
Differences in poverty levels and standards of living when comparing married and single 
co-resident mothers are more than likely a result of married mothers receiving more 
financial support from an income-earning male which in turn leads to a higher quality of 
life.  As discussed in Chapter Two, a major reason why single co-resident mothers are 
less likely to have access to the income earned by a male is the malfunctioning of the 
private maintenance system.  Even when a father has the means to support his former 
partner and their children, the private maintenance system has proven largely ineffective 
in ensuring he fulfills this financial responsibility.  A consequence of this is that single 
co-resident mothers and their children, on average, have lower standards of living than 
their married counterparts.   
 
Reforming the private maintenance system can contribute towards overcoming the 
problems of poverty and inequality in South Africa.  Forcing fathers who can afford to 
pay maintenance to actually make these payments may result in substantial improvements 
in the quality of life of many single-mother families.  Moreover, compelling these fathers 
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to pay may free-up state finances – for example if mothers switch from public to private 
health care – and these public resources can then be targeted to help other single co-
resident mothers whose former partners are too poor to make financial contributions.     
 
This chapter has shown that for Africans and Whites, the socio-economic status of 
married co-resident mothers, on average, is better than that of single co-resident mothers.  
This has been revealed using quantitative measures as well as a more qualitative analysis.  
It has also been shown that public transfers play an important part in poverty alleviation 
as without social grants, African single co-resident mothers, in particular would be much 
worse off than they currently are.  The important role of earnings in reducing poverty has 
also been highlighted which emphasizes the need for women to be provided with 
childcare facilities so that they can gain access to employment.  Providing women with 
greater opportunity for employment would be key to improving the economic status of 


















Appendix 4A: Type of illness or injury suffered by co-resident mother in month 
prior to survey. 
 
Table 4.A: Illness or injury suffered by co-resident mothers, 2006 
 Single Married 
 African 
Type of illness or injury:    
Mother had flu or upper respiratory tract 
infection 0.513 (0.022) 0.522 (0.021) 
Mother had diarrhea 0.043 (0.007) 0.040 (0.008) 
Mother experienced extreme trauma 0.037 (0.018) 0.023 (0.007) 
Mother had TB or severe cough with blood 0.074 (0.010) 0.043 (0.009) 
Mother abused alcohol or drugs 0.002 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) 
Mother had depression or mental illness 0.035 (0.007) 0.020 (0.005) 
Mother had diabetes 0.052 (0.009) 0.049 (0.008) 
Mother had high or low blood pressure 0.106 (0.012) 0.134 (0.014) 
Mother had HIV/AIDS 0.048 (0.010) 0.016* (0.005) 
Mother had other sexually transmitted 
disease 0.008 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 
Mother had other illness or injury 0.210 (0.018) 0.236 (0.018) 
 White 
Type of illness or injury:    
Mother had flu or upper respiratory tract 
infection 1.000 (0.000) 0.622 (0.098) 
Mother had diarrhea 0.102 (0.099) 0.038 (0.025) 
Mother experienced extreme trauma 0.000 (0.000) 0.028 (0.021) 
Mother had TB or severe cough with blood 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Mother abused alcohol or drugs 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Mother had depression or mental illness 0.000 (0.000) 0.009 (0.007) 
Mother had diabetes 0.147 (0.135) 0.006 (0.006) 
Mother had high or low blood pressure 0.147 (0.135) 0.006 (0.004) 
Mother had HIV/AIDS 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Mother had other sexually transmitted 
disease 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Mother had other illness or injury 0.000 (0.000) 0.346 (0.099) 
Source: GHS 2006  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Weighted estimates are obtained by accounting for clustering in 
the survey design.  Estimates only include co-resident mothers for whom race and marital status 
information is non-missing. 
* indicates a significant difference in proportions across single co-resident mothers and married co-resident 







Appendix 4B: Question 4.71 of the General Household Survey 2006 
 
Question 4.71 is on page 46 of the General Household Survey 2006 and is posed to a 
responsible adult in the household. 
 
4.71 During the past 12 months, has any member of this 
household…… 
Yes       No 
 a) had things stolen?  
 b) been harassed or threatened by a household member?  
 c) been harassed or threatened by someone outside the 
household? 
 
 d) been sexually molested by a household member?  
 e) been sexually molested by someone outside the 
household? 
 
 f) been beaten up or hurt by a household member?  
 g) been beaten up or hurt by someone outside the 
household? 
 
 h) been murdered by a household member?  












The primary objective of this dissertation was to evaluate the economic status of single 
mothers compared to married mothers.  This information is particularly important given 
the focus of the South African government on poverty alleviation and its desire to assist 
the most vulnerable of population groups (Zuma 2009).  In his 2009 State of the Nation 
address, the State President highlighted the plight of women and children in the struggle 
against resource deprivation and it is in this context that the particular difficulties faced 
by single-mother families need to be brought to light.  
 
Economic theory predicts that women, on average, will earn less than men. This is 
largely on account of women having specialised in household production whilst men 
have had the opportunity to further their careers in the labour market (Becker 1985; 
Mincer and Polachek 1974; Becker 1965). Moreover, empirical evidence continues to 
show that internationally and in South Africa gender gaps in the labour market persist 
(Posel and Rogan 2009a; Muller 2009; Ntuli 2007; Woolard and Woolard 2006; Fortin 
2005; Blau and Kahn 2000). In this context, single mothers who lack the financial 
support of a co-resident male partner would be expected to be worse off than married 
mothers who can depend on the income earned by their male spouse.  International 
studies have confirmed that single-mother families are indeed among the most 
impoverished families (Philo et al. 2009; Christopher et al. 2002; Wong et al. 1993). 
However a lack of research in this area domestically has prevented robust conclusions 
being drawn regarding the economic status of the average South African single mother.  
The scarcity of studies in South Africa is largely due to the fact that historically it has 
been difficult for researchers to match women with their children.  However, recent 
surveys have included data that have facilitated the identification of mothers.  
 
Using the GHS 2006 I identified over seven million mothers aged from 19 to 65 who are 
co-resident with at least one of their children aged 18 or younger.  Of this number, over 
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three million are single mothers.  The lack of a birth module makes it impossible to 
identify all mothers as only women who are living with their children can be included in 
the sample via a maternal relationship question.  Posel and van der Stoep (2008) calculate 
that in 2002 about 14 per cent of African mothers of reproductive age and 4.5 per cent of 
mothers from other race groups did not reside with at least one of their children.  This 
would suggest that the incidence of motherhood, and single motherhood, in South Africa 
is actually much higher than that estimated by a sample subject to a co-residency 
requirement.   
 
The disadvantage of using the GHS 2006, therefore, is that many mothers in South Africa 
who do not live with their children are excluded from the analysis. Given that the labour 
force participation rate among not co-resident mothers is higher than the rate among 
mothers who live with their children, the sample of mothers identified by the GHS 2006 
will underestimate labour force participation, and hence income, among mothers (Posel 
and van der Stoep 2008).  This is particularly relevant for African single mothers as Posel 
and Casale (2006) find that a significant proportion of labour migrants are African 
females.  Furthermore, Posel and van der Stoep (2008) show that not co-resident mothers 
are less likely to be married.  Although the subset of mothers identified by the GHS 2006 
is a non-random sample of mothers it does allow an investigation of the economic status 
of mothers who live with their children and who therefore face comparable daily 
childcare commitments.  Furthermore, it is possible to compare the economic wellbeing 
of these mothers by marital status.   
 
The advantage of using this dataset is that it includes information on grant income.  This 
is especially relevant when researching the welfare of mothers by marital status as 
international studies have shown that state transfers are instrumental in raising the 
economic status of women (Christopher et al. 2002).  Moreover, given South Africa’s 
relatively advanced social security system it is necessary to investigate whether grant 
income is assisting those individuals who need it most.  The decomposition of the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures shows that African single co-resident mothers are 
highly dependent on grants to reduce the depth and severity of poverty.  Indeed over 42 
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per cent of the households in which African single co-resident mothers live rely on 
pensions and grants as their primary source of income.  On average, African single co-
resident mothers receive significantly more grants, particularly the Child Support Grant 
(CSG) than their married counterparts, as well as than White co-resident mothers.   
 
Grant income does help to reduce the depth and severity of poverty among African 
married co-resident mothers, but the impact is smaller compared to their single 
counterparts.  Public transfers, on average, have little effect on the welfare of White co-
resident mothers.  Earned income is most instrumental in reducing the depth and severity 
of poverty for White mothers.  Wages and salaries also make a relatively large 
contribution to decreasing the poverty gap and poverty gap ratios for African mothers, 
particularly those who are married. For all four groups of mothers in the sample, earned 
income lowers the headcount rate by a minimum of 78 per cent.  “Other income” 
contributes towards poverty relief among co-resident mothers but the contribution is far 
smaller than that of earned income, as well as that of public transfers (among African 
mothers).  Included in “other income” may be private maintenance receipts, 
unemployment benefits, work pensions or gratuities; however from the available 
information it is not possible to divide this resource flow into the various categories. 
  
It would appear therefore that African single co-resident mothers are most dependent on 
public funding to improve their socio-economic wellbeing.  Of the four groups of 
mothers analysed, African single co-resident mothers, on average, had the least access to 
resources which would indicate that grant income is offering the greatest assistance to 
those who need it most.  With public transfers placing financial demands on the 
government budget, however, it is necessary to investigate other mechanisms that can 
assist single mothers and simultaneously reduce the burden on state funds.  Moreover, the 
value of the CSG is low and single mothers who earn more than 28,000 Rands per annum 
do not qualify for the grant and consequently they would need to rely on other 
mechanisms to obtain financial support for their families (Department of Social 
Development 2009).  The private maintenance system is meant to ensure that a parent 
who is not co-resident with their child fulfills the duty that they have to financially 
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maintain their child.  The failings of the system are well-documented, however, with the 
result being that many non resident parents are able to exploit the malfunctioning private 
maintenance system and thereby avoid paying for their children (Bonthuys 2008a; 
Bonthuys 2008b; Lund 2008; Triegaardt 2005).  In these instances, it is usually the 
mother that disproportionately bears the financial responsibility of childrearing.   
 
This dissertation has shown that when an African or White single co-resident mother is 
employed her salary accounts for approximately 60 and 77 per cent of her household’s 
financial resources respectively.  Furthermore, on average, 13 per cent of an employed 
African single co-resident mother’s household income is from grants or pensions.  This 
implies that, on average, the maximum assistance an employed White or African single 
mother can be receiving from her child’s father accounts for no more than 23 and 27 per 
cent of her household’s resources respectively.  These statistics suggest that employed 
single co-resident mothers, on average, are primarily responsible for paying for their 
children with relatively little assistance from their child’s father.  A limitation of the GHS 
2006 is that it does not specifically gather information on maintenance receipts. To 
address this issue, where expenditure exceeded income, I adjusted household resources to 
reflect the reported expenses of the household.  This is not a perfect measure of “other” 
income (partly because it assumes no dissaving in households), but it does provide a 
useful indication of the value of other resource flows.  Going forward, it would be of 
greater value if household surveys recorded the value of private maintenance receipts.  
These data can then be used to get a more accurate indication of the extent to which a non 
resident parent supports their child. 
 
As discussed in this study, despite the South African government’s stated intention to 
combat crimes against women and children (Zuma 2009), by allowing the private 
maintenance system to operate in its current inefficient form, the authorities are 
facilitating domestic violence in the form of economic abuse.  Furthermore, children 
whose fathers are able to contribute towards their economic wellbeing are being denied 
resources due to the failings of the maintenance system.  These children, who may have 
been able to access services in the private sector, may have to rely on the state to 
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subsidize them, for example, via public schooling and public health care.  Had these 
fathers been forced to pay which may have resulted in their children not having to rely on 
state sponsorship, then this would have freed up government funds to pay for children 
whose parents cannot afford to maintain them.  Thus fathers who default on maintenance 
are also responsible for denying poor children further state assistance.  As noted by 
Budlender (2005: 34):  
 
“In many cases there is a real problem in that the non-resident parent is 
unemployed and simply doesn’t have money to pay for the children.  In this case, 
the resident parent – usually a woman – bears an unfair burden, as she can’t simply 
tell the children: ‘I have no money’.  More serious are the cases where the absent 
parent does have money, but refuses to pay any of it to the mother and children, 
pays an inadequate amount, or pays very intermittently”. 
 
Given the inefficacy of the private maintenance system and the limited value and 
coverage of the CSG, the critical question facing the South African authorities is what 
can be done to improve the circumstances of single mothers.  This is an issue facing 
governments worldwide with some having found more effective solutions than others.  
Sweden is an example of a nation that has succeeded in combining public transfers, 
employment supports, guaranteed maintenance payments and a labour market 
characterised by fewer gender inequalities than in many other countries to make a 
significant improvement to the economic welfare of single-mother families. Moreover, 
Swedish mothers do not appear to be penalised if they are engaged in part-time work, 
thus allowing them more opportunity to care for their children.  
 
There also does not appear to be a wage penalty to female part-time employment in 
South Africa (Posel and Muller 2008).  However, South Africa fails to assist single 
mothers in ways in which other countries do.  South African women, on average, still 
suffer from a gender gap in earnings and they are still over-represented in lower 
paying occupations.  Moreover, the level of public sector assistance to single mothers 
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is markedly inferior to that offered by other countries, for example, Sweden and 
Norway, and the inefficiencies of the maintenance system are noted above.   
 
South Africa is unlikely to have the resources to introduce all the mechanisms that 
exist in the Scandinavian countries; hence, the best way forward may be to harness 
and improve the institutions that are already in place.  The reform of the private 
maintenance system has been a perennial theme in improving the welfare of single-
mother families.  Moreover the focus of the South African government on eliminating 
crimes against women and children necessitates the immediate improvement of this 
system.  A rational way forward would be to develop an objective formula to calculate 
maintenance obligations.  Whilst a father’s income level is supposed to be formally 
considered when determining the value of maintenance, as noted by Bonthuys (2008a) 
in many cases the amounts are determined simply by asking the father how much he 
thinks he can pay.  The success of an approach that uses a formula depends on the 
ability to accurately compute the father’s true resource level.  This is thwarted by 
fathers who deliberately conceal assets by, for example, ‘selling’ them to family 
members and family trusts.  To overcome this challenge, synergies between the 
maintenance office and the South African Revenue Service (SARS) should be 
developed.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the malfunctioning maintenance system would gain 
from adopting efficient work processes developed by SARS.  Furthermore, the results 
of investigations conducted by SARS could be used in maintenance enquiries that 
probe the true extent of fathers’ resources.  For example, a recent media bulletin has 
reported on lifestyle audits being conducted by SARS in Kwazulu-Natal in order to 
expose individuals guilty of tax evasion (Barbeau 2009).  These audits can be 
extended to investigate fathers who lead expensive lifestyles yet conceal their 
resources when they are faced with a maintenance enquiry.  Moreover, the possibility 
exists that fathers guilty of defaulting on maintenance are also the individuals who 
attempt to evade paying taxes.  In such cases, two government departments can benefit 
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from one audit process which would increase the returns to the government from 
investing resources in the investigation.   
 
The problem of enforcing maintenance orders would be addressed by making the 
punishment for defaulting on maintenance sufficiently severe.  As noted in Chapter 
Two, fathers are seldom appropriately penalised for stopping maintenance payments 
and consequently they have great incentive to renege on their financial responsibilities 
towards their children.  As highlighted in this study, the Maintenance Act specifically 
incorporates financial fines and imprisonment as penalties for default and the 
authorities should impose these punishments far more readily than they currently do.  
 
Another focus of policymakers should be the education of women.  There is evidence 
of an increase in female education (Casale and Posel 2005) in recent years which will 
improve women’s prospects in the labour market.  However, as noted by Christopher 
et al. (2002) merely increasing the employment rates of women will not improve the 
welfare of single mothers unless gender gaps are eliminated.  Moreover, the effects on 
women of reducing their time with their children as they increase their hours at work 
has not been fully quantified in the South African context.  Fortin (2005) shows that 
inner conflicts such as ‘mother’s guilt’ impact negatively on labour market outcomes 
for women.  This would suggest that there is an opportunity cost for some women to 
increased labour market participation in the form of foregone time parenting their 
children.  South African policymakers would therefore need to account for these issues 
in devising the appropriate strategies to assist single mothers.  Fortin (2005) highlights 
that policies designed to address the work-life reconciliation, like flexible work hours, 
maternity leave and on-site/affordable day-care have been shown to have a positive 
effect on women’s employment rates.  Thus along with aiming to secure full-time 
employment for single mothers, the authorities should consider alternatives that, for 
example, combine part-time employment with a better functioning maintenance 
system and improved public benefits for children.  This option will allow a mother to 
assume greater responsibility for childcare without being penalised for doing so.  
 
 101
A further strategy would be to educate women on what constitutes a healthy 
relationship in an attempt to ensure they make good choices when selecting a partner.  
If women are advised of the consequences of a failed relationship and of the failings of 
the private maintenance system and of trends in child custody arrangements prior to 
having to engage with the legal system, this may incentivise them to avoid potentially 
unstable unions.  Indeed, publicizing the inefficiencies of the maintenance system may 
be the act that motivates the authorities to finally reform the system.  As noted by 
Mauldin and Mimura (2007: 580): 
 
“programs that intervene prior to marriage, helping women understand the potential 
consequences of their choices might prove more beneficial than programs that 
intervene after a marriage has occurred”. 
 
This dissertation has sought to address a gap in the economic literature and has shown 
that single co-resident mothers, on average, are worse off than their married counterparts.  
Furthermore, I have shown that children dependent on a single co-resident mother would 
comprise a substantial portion of the South African population.  Single co-resident 
mothers in 2006 numbered over three million and each single co-resident mother has at 
least one child under 18.  Thus the number of children supported by a single co-resident 
mother should be well over three million after accounting for all siblings.  This would 
suggest that many single mothers and their children are affected by the adverse economic 
status of the average single-mother family.  I have also highlighted the disparity in the 
access to resources when comparing African co-resident mothers with White co-resident 
mothers. Clearly the racial differences in income that became entrenched during the 
apartheid-era still impact upon the socio-economic landscape today.   
 
The South African government needs to focus more attention on single-mother families 
of all races who, on average, will continue to suffer from an inferior economic status 
compared to traditional two-parent families unless the authorities place more emphasis on 
their plight.  To ensure the credibility of its commitment to improving the economic 
status of South African women and children, this study has highlighted that the 
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government needs to focus immediate attention particularly on reforming an ineffective 
maintenance system.  A qualitative enquiry into the experiences of women who have 
unsuccessfully navigated the system would further uncover the limitations of the system, 
and would help explain why maintenance income does not contribute more to the 
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